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YANOMAMO WARFARE, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND MARRIAGE ALLIANCES

By Napoleon Alphonseau Chagnon

121 The purpose of this analysis is to show that the large discrepancy (over 50%) between ideal marriage rules and actual marriage practice among the Yąnomamö Indians of Southern Venezuela is necessitated by the politico-military milieu within which marriages are contracted. The data 114 covered in this thesis were collected from November 1964 through February 1966 during which time the author lived with these Indians. Inter-village warfare was chronic while the 124 field work was conducted. All the data were obtained from the Yąnomamö in their language.

162 Census data on five Yąnomamö villages are presented 817 to show that the male/female sex ratio is high. The shortage 595 of women, initially caused by female infanticide, is compli- 834 cated further by the practice of polygyny and coitus taboos 721 and is shown to be the basis of both internal and inter- 182 village fighting. Detailed historical data on village movements and warfare, collected from native informants and amplified by case materials on specific events that the author witnessed, are given to demonstrate the correlation of warfare to the shortage of women.

* 621 The imbalanced sex ratio is also shown to be the • 613 basis of competition between co-residential patrilineal 578 descent groups, and how the members of these ally themselves 562 to other, patrilineal, local descent groups in order to maximize the number of women to which each group's members have access. When intra-village feuding over women becomes particularly intense, larger villages are shown to fragment into smaller, independent villages whose initial composition resembles a dual organization of inter-marrying patrilineal 000 descent groups. Genealogical data in both sociological and

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Genealogical data in both sociological and biological form are given for one small village to demonstrate the dual organization tendency. Similar data on two other villages from which this sample village recently split are presented to show that affinal ties between local descent groups are structurally more stable than agnatic ties between such groups, and that these affinal ties hold local descent groups together when larger villages fragment, resulting in the break-up of lineages and the redistribution of their members into mutually hostile, independent villages.

The intensity and tactics of warfare are shown to determine in large measure both the size of the village and the political conditions that promote inter-village alliances based on marriage. Finally, the techniques of slash-and-burn horticulture are discussed to show how economic dependence on cultivated food promotes the establishment of political alliances based on marriage exchanges and determines the direction of movement of relocated villages.

Three conclusions are drawn from the analysis. First, the frequency of intra-village fighting and inter-village warfare co-varies with the frequency with which males may legitimately satisfy sexual desires; anything that increases female/male ratio or the sexual activity of females reduces feuding. Second, the degree to which marriage practice conforms to marriage rules is predictable once the conditions of warfare are specified. When warfare is chronic, alliances between historically unrelated villages require a breach of marriage rules when women pass between these groups. Comparative data on Brazilian Yąnomamö social organization are given to support these conclusions. Third, the data bearing on Yąnomamö social organization support E. R. Leach's contention that the political and economic contexts within which marriages take place must be considered as part of the ongoing social organization and must be included in analyses of the latter. By so doing, the analysis shows that integration between Yąnomamö lineal descent corporations does not necessarily derive from inherent properties cognatic kinship as argued by Meyer Fortes.

reasoning, as most of the Yąnomamö villages are presently uncontacted, and those that are in contact with foreigners have only recently (since 1951) entered into these contacts.

Yąnomamö marriages, even the preferred form, are influenced by the milieu of inter-village hostility within which they are contracted. Marriages in this milieu have as their major function the promotion of social ties between the descent groups represented in the exchange and are best understood as the deployment of women between groups with the purpose of promoting political and military alliances. The groups in question may be of two kinds: the local patrilineages comprising a particular village, or the members of different villages as such. As the only corporate group among the Yąnomamö is the local lineage, marriages within and between villages are to be understood as alliances between different corporate groups.[1]

The variables affecting marriage practice--weakness of descent as a solidarity-promoting medium, village size and instability, the chronic nature of warfare, the shortage of women, attitudes about aggressiveness and demonstration of ferocity by individuals, and economic practices--are such that some deviation from the normative marriage rules is necessary to insure maximum survival chances for the residents of the various autonomous villages. Because marriage exchanges in general have political and military implications,

[1]Yąnomamö villages are not corporate groups.

000 marriage exchanges with other groups.

The weakness of kinship[1]

Few institutions promote solidarity between the local lineages of a village on the one hand and between allied villages on the other. Consanguineal kinship ties are weak; so weak, that the most bitter fighting usually takes place between villages comprised of closely related kinsmen. The roles of leaders are poorly defined, and headmen can rarely reconcile dissident factions within their own villages. Moreover, there are a number of factors constantly threatening the stability of local groups, and these factors likewise weaken political relationships between allied villages. Within villages fighting frequently breaks out over food thefts and over sexual liaisons. In the latter case the fighting takes the form of dueling with clubs, and usually the result is that the village splits; one of the factions establishes a garden elsewhere and becomes an independent village. As the histories of selected villages will show (see below, Chapter 5), the settlement pattern of Yanomamö villages is cyclical; it results from the splitting of larger villages, the renewed growth of the splinter groups into large villages, followed by recurrent splitting and growth ad infinitum. Kinship as a medium for promoting solidarity within villages loses its efficacy when villages

[1]It is difficult to discuss each variable affecting marriage alliances as operating by itself, for they are intimately interconnected, and I list them separately only to point out their major features.

phenomenon: the feuds that lead to the splitting of villages and the cause of fighting between villages are largely the result of the shortage of women.

Within villages, then, the bachelors and those men whose wives are either pregnant or are nursing children constantly threaten village stability by seeking liaisons with the wives of other men. The discovery of these liaisons usually leads to violent fighting between the group of close relatives of the woman's husband and that of her lover; and this frequently causes the village to split. The larger the village, the more likely it is that such liaisons will develop and that the subsequent fighting will lead to fragmentation of the village.

Village size, then, is limited by the capacity of the kinship network to regulate internal feuds, and by the nature of the actual or current warfare pattern of the neighboring villages. As the village grows in size, the incidence of extra-marital affairs and club-fights appears to increase, while the ability of kinship to regulate the affairs of a multi-lineage village diminishes in proportion. Villages then split into smaller groups that comprise two or more small, cohesive, intermarrying local lineages; each group establishes an independent village and enters into marriage alliances with other villages. The prior existence of hostilities with other villages may delay the split, but does not prevent it. In short, the relationship of Yanomamö village size to village solidarity nicely illustrates Leslie

which is tied a bundle of feathers.[1]

Besides shamans, of which there are several in every village, there are influential 'big men.' The number of big men in a village depends, on the one hand, on the size of the village and the number of local patrilineages comprising it, and, on the other, on the number of men who are personally qualified to lead. The qualities that determine leadership are personal courage, fierceness, the ability to be outraged by even the slightest insult, marksmanship, diplomacy in trading with representatives from other villages, the ability to arrange marriages for male supporters with females from other villages, cunning and intelligence in dealings with allies, the ability to attract young men to live permanently in the village by promising them wives, and the defense of group members who get into difficulties with other village members.

Individuals who possess all these attributes are considered leaders only if they have a large natural following, i.e., brothers and sons living with them in their village. Otherwise, such men have only just a little more

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[1] To give a more comparative statement on the poverty of Yąnomamö culture, they possess only 11 traits of the 354 listed in the 4th edition of Carneiro and Tobias' "Trait List to be Used for the Study of Cultural Evolution by Means of Scale Analysis," (1963, mimeograph). By contrast, the Siriono have 8, the Andamanese 10, the Jivaro 22, the Nuer 28, the Siuai 39, the Iroquois 64, the Bemba 100 and the Tahitians 140. (Carneiro and Tobias, 1963:201.) In the classification developed by E. R. Service (1962), the Yąnomamö are "tribal."

CHAPTER III

DESCENT, MARRIAGE, KINSHIP AND IDEOLOGY

As noted in the introduction, the largest Yąnomamö political unit, the village, is structurally unstable and tends to fragment into hostile factions once the population of the village reaches a certain size.[1] Village splitting results in the establishment of smaller villages the members of which, for considerations of defense, make alliances with other villages, basing the political ties on the exchange of women. The dynamics of village splitting can be illustrated in a number of ways. In Chapter V the histories of particular villages are set down in some detail, illustrating the nature of the causes of internal struggles. In this chapter, however, I shall discuss the aspects of Yąnomamö descent, marriage, kinship and political ideology that illustrate the role each plays in determining the nature of feuds. This will provide the background for the next chapter, the analysis of village splitting in terms of the genealogical composition of recently established villages.

A. Yąnomamö Corporate Lineal Descent Groups and Marriage

Corporate lineal descent groups tend to be closely

[1] Village size is discussed in the next chapter.

associated with control over real property in most tribal societies. Among the Yąnomamö the corporate estate consists of rights in disposing of females; property does not play any role in the functioning of the descent group.

The relationship between males in regulating the disposition of the descent group's women is ambiguous, for their rights in particular women vary, largely with genealogical distance and the size of the descent group in question. And, rights in women are intangible. Thus, local descent groups[1] among the Yąnomamö, despite the fact that they are corporate, are not cohesive, solidary units because of the ambiguous way male members are related to each other.

Patrilineal descent is virtually non-functional outside the local descent group. There are no corporate descent groups other than those that exist at the village level, i.e., the Yąnomamö do not have clans or moieties. Hence, agnates not only enter into competition with each other because of the nature of their rights in the women of their group, there are no other institutions based on agnatic descent that promote amity and solidarity among them.

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[1] "The core of such a group is composed of the adult males of a kin group all resident in one place . . . the corporate group of persons who have the most decisive say in bringing about an arranged marriage is always a group of co-resident males representing, as a rule, three genealogical generations, namely: the old men or grandfathers, the normal adults or fathers, and the young adults or sons." E. R. Leach, 1963:56. Among the Yąnomamö, the generation of grandfathers is only rarely represented in the local descent group.

613 162 In addition to genealogical distance and size of descent groups, demographic factors promote ambiguity in the relationships between males within a local descent group. For reasons of differential fertility, infanticide, warfare mortality, or chance, some local descent groups are larger than others (contain more males) and are, therefore, more powerful. Others may be relatively large, but contain more females than males. Still others may be very small and contain either all males or all females. Since Yanomamö kinship terminology is classificatory (Iroquois), all agnatically related males of the same generation call each other 'brother'; parallel cousins, no matter how remote genealogically, are not terminologically distinguished from brothers. Despite the terminological usage, relationships between such agnates varies considerably.

613 602 *621 584 582 Problems of agnatic priority in the disposition of females arise, for example, when a man with no actual brothers gives his daughters away in marriage. If he has sons, the sons would prefer that the girls be given to members of other local descent groups who are most likely able to reciprocate with women. As the father has no actual brothers, his more distant agnates put pressure on him to give the girls to a descent group to which they themselves are linked by marriage ties, for they stand to benefit by future reciprocities. Situations such as this arise when a single man finds himself in the same village with a group of agnates that are distantly related to him, but who themselves constitute an important political bloc within the village. Although the agnates are

613 602 621 584 582 his brothers, terminologically, they have more in common with each other than they do with him. As he depends on them for support within the village, he is under obligation to them and can not take their suggestions lightly.[1]

621 613 602 582 584 736 Again, if there are two politically important descent groups of the same lineage within a large village, and if there are, in addition, a number of agnatically related females not belonging unambiguously to either one, problems arise over the disposition of the women; there will be rivalry between the two descent groups concerning the marriages (or remarriages) of these women. Situations like these arise when the father and brothers of the women are killed in raids or die of other causes, or when the woman's first husband dies after her (deceased) agnates arranged her marriage. The Bisaasi-tedi, for example, split into two villages, each led by members of the same lineage. They had been victimized by a Shamatari group which killed a large number of men during a treacherous feast. There were a number of women, consequently, who were ambiguously related to the surviving males of the Upper and Lower halves of Bisaasi-tedi. One of the descent groups in what is now Lower Bisaasi-tedi managed to gain the upper hand in the

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[582] [1]There seems to be a marked tendency for the daughters of such men to be given to men in other villages when alliances are made. I am unable to say, on the basis of my present data, whether such alliances are forced on these men by their agnates, or whether these men in fact prefer to dispose of their daughters in this way. This practice tends to keep such men more isolated from their agnates and prevents them from establishing strong affinal ties within the village.

613 621 602 562 584 726 disposition of these women and their children, a factor that did not contribute to the amity of relationships between the two agnatically related descent groups.[1]

582 584 593 621 A girl's marriage is arranged by her close male kinsmen. Her father has the greatest influence in the decision as to which man she will be given. If the man had adult sons, their opinion can overrule the decision of the father. If a girl marries within the village, she can depend on her agnates for protection against a cruel husband. Ideally, a woman prefers to marry her FaSiSo or her MoBrSo.[2] If the marriage rule is not followed, women prefer to be given to a non-kinsman within the village.

583 591 584 602 721 628 Men are obliged to perform bride service in the village of their inlaws, after which they may take their wife back to their natal village. Occasionally a woman leaves her natal village to seek a husband in another village, but this is always against the wishes of the girl's agnates. Such situations usually develop into wars between the village of the girl and the village that took the girl. The war between

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[728] [1]See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of this incident.

[601] [2]By FaSiSo I do not exclusively mean the biological relative, although he, too, would be included. By extending their kinship terminology, the Yanomamö also include non-consanguines in these categories of relatives. For example, a young man in Bisaasi-tedi married his FaBrWiBrDa while I was in the field. To him, the girl was his MoBrDa because FaBr was 'father' and 'father's wife' was 'mother'; the girl, therefore, was MoBrDa.

the Na wei-tedi and the Boreta-tedi (Chapter V) developed out of a case such as this.

When women are given to men in allied villages, the local descent group of the girl (her father and adult brothers and, to a lesser extent, the girl's more distant agnates) decides which patrilineage of the foreign village should have her. Smaller villages are more prone to enter into alliances based on marriage exchanges than are larger villages, since smaller villages require allies to a greater extent than larger ones.[1] Local descent groups in small villages are more cohesive than descent groups in larger villages because they usually comprise a man and his adult sons; if there are distantly related agnates in small villages, these are incorporated into the local descent group. In small villages, therefore, local descent groups are more corporate because all the adult agnates of the girl have a say in her marriage. Ideally, they give the girl to a member of the politically strongest descent group of the allied village, for this group is the one from which aid will come or, conversely, the one most likely to make the decision to initiate hostilities against the smaller village.

The longer an alliance endures, the more likely it is that the exchange of women balances. The two largest

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[1]Larger Yanomamö villages can make visiting alliances with other groups that do not lead to marriage exchanges, as it is relatively unimportant to them to stabilize such alliances by ceding women to militarily inferior groups.

*628 lineages in Bisaasi-tedi, Monou-tedi, and Patanowë-tedi have
592 exchanged women with each other for a number of generations.
583 Male members of the Hor lineage entered into 29 marriage acts[1]
• 613 with women of the Sha lineage.[2] An identical number of acts involving Sha men with Hor women also took place. In the exchanges between Mõmaribõwei-tedi and their two allies, the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi, there is presently an imbalance in the exchange of women, although reciprocity appears to be developing; a number of women from the latter two villages are promised to members of Mõmaribõwei-tedi—to members of lineages that have already given women to th[illegible]i-tedi and the Monou-tedi.

*628 An imbalance in the exchange of women implies a dif-
613 ference in political strength between the two groups that
592 exchange women, and the mechanics of the exchange are shaped
583 by this difference in political strength. Post marital resi-
591 dence is viri-patrilocal after the groom performs bride service, but the length of the bride service is determined by the relative political strength of the two villages concerned. If the village of the groom is more powerful than that of the bride, the groom may be able to return to his village with his wife after just a few months of bride service. If the

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[1] See Ackerman, 1964, for a definition of marriage act.

[2] Yąnomamõ lineages are not named. I have named them [128] for expediency of analysis after the oldest identifiable member of the lineage, abbreviating the name to three letters. "Sha" lineage, therefore, is the name I have adopted for the patrilineal descendents of a long since dead individual called Shamashiadima.

*628 bride's village is stronger, the girl's parents may be able
618 to press the groom into a prolonged bride service--five or
582 six years. The Bisaasi-tedi, for example, are politically
583 stronger than the Reyabobŏwei-tedi, one of their Shamatari
591 allies. They have obtained a number of women from this group, and the men involved all returned with their brides after brief periods of bride service. So far, not a single Bisaasi-tedi woman has gone to live in Reyabobŏwei-tedi, although one girl is married to a man from that village. The man has already spent several years in Bisaasi-tedi, and will probably spend at least as many more before being permitted to return home with his Bisaasi-tedi wife. The military and political superiority of the Bisaasi-tedi is so conspicuous in this alliance that one Bisaasi-tedi man literally dragged a woman, previously promised to him, out of the Reyabobŏwei-tedi village, against the wishes of both the woman and the woman's agnates. He was not prevented from doing this because the Reyabobŏwei-tedi need the political and military support of the Bisaasi-tedi and could not afford to react violently
[721] to the affront. Had the two villages been politically equal, the incident would have resulted in a war.

*628 Women involved in exchanges between villages have no
583 say whatsoever in their fate. Most of them abhor the pos-
584 sibility of moving to a strange village, largely because they fear that they will be mistreated by their husbands. Should a girl refuse to abide by the decision of her agnates, she has no alternative but to flee the village. Koima, a girl of

*623 Koima, a girl of
• 613 some 15 years, was promised to Rerebawä, a young man from
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583 Karohi-tedi, an ally of the Bisaasi-tedi. Rerebawä had
606 already been given Koima's older sister, Shihotama, by whom he had two children. Rerebawä wished to return to his own village, as he had performed a lengthy bride service. His parents-in-law, however, wanted him to remain in Bisaasi-tedi permanently, as they had no sons to help them with the gardening or to provide them with meat. Rerebawä began making frequent trips to his own village. His wife's parents feared that he might not return, so they kept his wife's children in Bisaasi-tedi, knowing that she would return even if her husband did not. This coercion was not working effectively, and Rerebawä was growing impatient. His parents-in-law, therefore, promised him Koima, their second daughter,
584 provided that he remain in Bisaasi-tedi. Koima, however,
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591 refused to go to Rerebawä, suspecting that he would not keep
578 his promise to remain in Bisaasi-tedi. She preferred, instead,
335 Bäkotawä, her classificatory PaSiSo. She began an affair with
613 Bäkotawä, making no attempt to be discreet. This infuriated
*624 Rerebawä, who challenged Bäkotawä to a club fight. Bäkotawä
627 belonged to one of the important lineages in Bisaasi-tedi and was cognatically related to the members of the headman's
[626] descent group, another important lineage. Public sentiment was on Bäkotawä's side, but the girl belonged to a descent group over whose affairs Bäkotawä's supporters had no claims. Rerebawä's challenge was legitimate, for the girl was promised to him by her agnates: Bäkotawä was, in effect, having an

584 affair with his wife. The parties in question armed themselves with sharpened clubs and faced each other in the center of the village, but actual fighting was averted. Despite the legitimacy of Rerebawä's claims, no one stepped forward to take his side in the feud, so he backed down. After this incident, Rerebawä threatened to kill Koima, but the headman dissuaded him. Koima and her mother then fled to Monou-tedi and took refuge with kinsmen there, reducing the probability of Rerebawä shooting Koima. Her mother tried to coax her into abiding by the wishes of her kinsmen and go to Rerebawä, but she obstinately refused. She ultimately eloped with Bäkotawä, and the two of them fled to a distant village on the Padamo River. Rerebawä discovered where they had gone and attempted, unsuccessfully, to recover Koima. If she returns to Bisaasi-tedi she will be given to Rerebawä, who will have ample reason to thrash her soundly.

B. Yąnomamö Kinship[1]

602 The structural relationships between descent groups within Yąnomamö villages can be expressed in terms of dyadic kin ties. Considerable theoretical attention has been devoted to this analytical procedure in recent structural treatments

[1] Migliazza (1964) published a kinship diagram for the Uraricaa Yąnomamö. Although the terms differ from those current among the Upper Orinoco Yąnomamö, the pattern (Iroquois) is the same. I defer discussion of the complete kinship terminology to a later publication, as there are enough peculiarities in usage to warrant a more complete treatment than would be appropriate here.

593 684 the enraged husband struck his wife in the face with a burning log, severely burning her mouth. Burning is a common punishment, and many women bear immense scars from wounds inflicted by enraged husbands. Just before I left the field [578] a fight developed in Patanowä-tedi between a man and his wife's lover. The lover was killed in the fight and the woman's husband punished her by cutting off her ears with a [165] machete. Some women have been killed by enraged husbands, but in most of these cases, the deaths resulted from wounds that were not intended to be fatal.

607 • 613 *621 *628 [593] Despite the fact that the tie between spouses is weak, marriages create strong ties between a man and his sister's husband. This tie is of great significance in the social organization of the Yąnomamö, as it is stable, well defined, non-ambiguous and politically important. The brother-in-law (shoriwä) tie is the key link in alliances between local descent groups, both within and between villages.

607 601 The term shoriwä (brother-in-law, MoBrSo, FaSiSo, friend) is used constantly by Yąnomamö men when they address any new male acquaintance. Shoriwä implies a set of obligations and duties between the speakers. One can depend on his shoriwä for material goods and gifts, and a request for such items from a shoriwä is not easily denied: shoriwä is, in addition to goods-giver, wife-giver. The Yąnomamö use this [797] [609] [101] term for foreigners as well; they use it so frequently that the Salesian Missionaries who have recently contacted a few

*628 581 609 Affinal ties between villages, therefore, owe their ability to promote solidarity between the allies to the obligations, duties and trading relationships that marriages impose on brothers-in-law.

607 602 *621 591 Within villages, brothers-in-law have similar obligations to each other. The strength of the co-residential shoriwä ties, however, is influenced by other factors besides promises to exchange goods, women, and services. First, co-residence itself promotes a certain amount of amity between all classes of kin. Second, co-residential shoriwä are usually cognatically related because their respective agnatic groups have exchanged women in ascending generations, i.e., many of them are related to each other as MoBrSo or FaSiSo. So, in addition to mere promises to give women to each other, co-residential shoriwä ties are strengthened by ties of cognatic kinship and co-residence.

609 602 *621 • 613 582 584 The strength of the ties between co-residential shoriwä is best illustrated by contrasting it to the weakness of the agnatic tie between two local descent groups of the same lineage. In anticipation of the discussion of agnatic relationship, I will point out here that the political interests of local descent groups focus on acquisition of women from other descent groups within the village. When a village has two or more agnatically related descent groups, the men in these respective groups are de facto rivals for the women in the village. Simultaneously, these distantly related agnates are frequently competitors in the disposition of some female agnates who do not belong unambiguously to one or the other local descent groups.

groups. In a large village comprised of two large lineages, each having two or more local descent groups, the particular local descent groups of each lineage will have stronger ties with non-agnatic descent groups within that village than with groups of distantly related agnates. When there are feuds within the village, the groups that have most in common with each other are those linked by affinal rather than agnatic ties, and these affinally linked groups stick together should the feud lead to a village split.[1] While the tie between closely related agnates is stronger than that between brothers-in-law, the latter are usually stronger than the ties between distantly related agnates.

Finally, the son-in-law tie complements the brother-in-law tie in binding local descent groups to each other within villages. Older adult males of local descent groups can depend on the support of brothers, brothers-in-law, and sons-in-law in village feuds, more so than on the support of distantly related agnates. In the competition for women, affines in a faction exchange women rather than compete for them; just the opposite is true of the relationships between distantly related agnates.

2. Agnatic ties

. One of the two most important consanguineal ties having structural concomitants among the Yąnomamö is the tie between siblings of the opposite sex. These are not as

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[1] See Chapter IV for a detailed discussion of the structure of village factions.

884 personal names provides an adequate excuse to exhibit rage and ferocity.

593 621 Personal relationships between brothers, therefore, tends to be one of mutual respect and reserve when the brothers reach adulthood. Age, however, confers a certain amount of status in Yąnomamö society, and an older man can command a younger adult brother to do tasks for him, provided their ages are considerably different. An older brother is expected to defend a young sibling in fights and assist him [583] [595] in obtaining a wife. A number of young men in Bisaasi-tedi obtained wives from polygynous older brothers. Young men, on the other hand, assist and support older brothers more willingly than they will a brother of similar age, as siblings of similar age deliberately demonstrate that they can not be bossed around by an equal.

*621 602 591 Co-residence influences the strength of the tie between distant agnates in some instances. If, for example, a man has no close agnates in a village but there is a group of more distantly related agnates, the man tends to be absorbed *[628] as an equal in that group. In fact, he may be effectively closer to his co-residential agnates despite genealogical distance than to close genealogical agnates who live in other *621 villages. Upper Bisaasi-tedi, for example, is led by Kąobawä • 613 602 of the Sha lineage. All agnates in his following are at least one 591 degree of blood removed from him[1] but they behave as if they were [22]

[1] See Figure 3, "Upper Bisaasi-tedi, Chapter IV.

full brothers and constitute a local descent group by virtue of their co-residence.

The relationship of age differential between agnates and the strength of the agnatic tie can be illustrated by Kaobawë's relationships to the men in his descent group. Two of them are much young than he (Shadadama, 22; Shararaiwë, 18). Whenever Kaobawë organizes a feast, these two young men do much of the laborious work of preparing the food and cooking it, going on the 5-7 day hunt to obtain the meat, and making the bark trough to contain the cooked food. Another agnate, Nadesiwë, 45 years old, does nothing to assist in the preparations for feasts. He is about 5 years older than Kaobawë. The two remaining agnates, Rapeawë, 45, and Shiimima, 28, each participate to a very limited degree in the work. Shiimima, the younger of these two, does more work than the other, and usually takes charge of the hunting and directs the labors of the two youngest men in preparing the food. The two youngest agnates, however, do more work than all of the older ones put together. They, in turn, do even less work than Kaobawë's adopted son, a Shamatari boy of 16 years. A great deal of the work is done by Kaobawë's nephew, Bäkotawë, 18 years old.

Kaobawë's ability to command his agnates to execute tasks varies inversely with the ages of these men. Once Shiimima took my flashlight. I discovered by devious means who the culprit was, and asked Kaobawë to have Shiimima return it to me, presuming that he could order him to do so.

Several days went by and I still did not have the item, so I asked Kɨobawɨ what he had done about it. He said he had spoken to Shiiximɨa, but the matter then rested with him: "He will give it to you if it is his desire to do so." I ultimately had to resort to my own means to recover the flashlight, as Kɨobawɨ could not force Shiiximɨa to return it. When I questioned Kɨobawɨ about this ineffectiveness, he explained: "Shiiximɨa is already fierce and I can not order him around." Thus, while he could command his youngest siblings to do things, he had to rely on example and suggestion to get older agnates to do the same things. Before every feast, for example, the village clearing is cleaned by scraping up the weeds and debris that accumulate, and hauling them out of the village. As the younger agnates are busy preparing the food for the feast, they can not clean the clearing. Kɨobawɨ usually goes to the center of the village and begins cleaning up the debris himself. After a while, his older agnates join him, and perhaps their spouses as well. They would be inclined, however, to refuse to do the work if Kɨobawɨ requested them to do it, for acquiescence in this regard implies that one is being bossed around.

Within a local descent group, therefore, the relative age of the agnates is crucial to the solidarity of the group and the effectiveness of its leadership. If the father of a group of brothers is alive, he will be the leader, and the group functions quite smoothly. When he dies, however, the solidarity and strength of the group diminishes, as adult

593 602 613 agnates of similar age tend to compete, rather than cooperate, with each other in the affairs of the group. Each behaves in such a way that it is obvious to all that he is not being bossed around by his equals. Finally, this competition and lack of solidarity is even more pronounced when there are two or more local descent groups of the same lineage within the village. [621]

621 601 628 591 124 Co-residence as a factor in promoting solidarity can be illustrated by kinship usage. One of my female informants, Epobawë's wife, used affinal terms for a number of Patanowë-tedi men who were technically her agnates. I was certain that my genalogies were correct, so I re-investigated the usage. I discovered that she used 'distant' kinship terms for these 'brothers' because they lived in a different village, but that she had called them by brother terms when they lived together in Patanowë-tedi. She explained that she would again use brother terms if the two villages were to re-unite. Although the terms for agnates normally do not change when a distant agnate joins a local descent group, the co-efficient of solidarity does.

628 602 613 726 The weakness of the tie between distantly related agnates can also be demonstrated with data on fighting. After the Patanowë-tedi separated from the Bisaasi-tedi and the Monou-tedi in the early '40s, hostilities between the two groups developed. Each group, however, was similar in composition[1] in that each comprised local descent groups of the

[1] See Figure 3, Chapter IV, and Appendix A for the breakdown of the populations of these villages by lineage membership.

same lineages. The warfare between the two groups, therefore, was largely a struggle between groups of distantly related agnates. Kɛobawɛ̃, the headman of Upper Bisaasi-tedi, participated in the raiding against the Patanowɛ̃-tedi. In one skirmish, he shot his classificatory brother, Rakoiwɛ̃, but Rakoiwɛ̃ survived the wound. This man is as closely related to Kɛobawɛ̃ as most of the men that presently constitute his agnatic following in Upper Bisaasi-tedi, again illustrating the significance of co-residence in determining the strength of the agnatic tie. Two young men from Patanowɛ̃-tedi recenlty joined the Bisaasi-tedi to obtain wives. After they arrived, the Bisaasi-tedi and the Patanowɛ̃-tedi resumed their old hostilities. The fathers-in-law of the two men recruited both of them into raiding parties that attacked the Patanowɛ̃-tedi, and both men participated willingly, despite the fact that their actual fathers and brothers live in Patanowɛ̃-tedi. One of the young men, Sirorowɛ̃, told me that he would have avoided shooting his own father (Yoyosiwɛ̃) and actual brothers, but would have shot more distant agnates.

That the brother-in-law tie is stronger than the tie between distantly related agnates is also illustrated in the history of a war between Mahekodo-tedi and Yabitawɛ̃-tedi. These two villages are led by men who are classificatory brothers. The war stated when a man from Boreta-tedi, a brother-in-law of the headman of Mahekodo-tedi, was killed by the Yabitawɛ̃-tedi headman in a club fight. As the slain man's sisters were married to the Mahekodo-tedi headman, the

*728 724 602 607 622 latter felt obliged to revenge the man's death by raiding his classificatory brother's village.

Similar cases occur in internal village fighting. *624 578 593 Hunobawë, an Upper Bisaasi-tedi man of some 60 years, gathered a stalk of bananas from his garden and hung them in the roof of his hut to ripen. His son, Dikawë, 18 years old, discovered the ripening bananas and ate a large number of them without the consent of his father. When Hunobawë discovered the loss, he went into a rage and attacked Dikawë with a club. Dikawë got his own club and began assailing the old man. This precipitated a general free-for-all in the village, as large numbers of men took one side or the other in the melee.

*628 602 578 613 583 Club fights between historically related but separate villages also pit agnates against each other. When Bisaasi-tedi's Lower Group seized a girl that the Monou-tedi had abducted from the Patanowë-tedi, a club fight was arranged to settle the dispute. But, the most important factions in Monou-tedi and the two Bisaasi-tedi groups were local descent groups of the same lineage, and their headmen were classificatory brothers. Although the dispute and club fight ultimately involved all the able-bodied men of each village, the fight was initiated by distantly related agnatic groups of the same lineage.

602 578 Some dyadic kinship ties are more stable than others. It is not possible to say, however, that any one in particular is so inherently stable that fighting between such kinsmen can not occur. Certain kinds of violence, however, are not

602 likely to take place between agnates of a certain degree of
578 blood relationship, or between affines that are cognatically
593 related. While a father and son may club each other, it is not likely that the fight will escalate to spear thrusting or shooting with arrows. The same may be said of full brothers, 593 but with less conviction. That is, full brothers occasionally *621 end up in different villages when a larger village splits, *628 particularly if they are the only males in the sibship. Should 726 a war develop between the two villages, there is a possibility that they might kill each other in the raiding; it is not always possible, in Yąnomamö warfare tactics, to pick a victim out of a crowd of people, as the Yąnomamö occasionally shower a village with arrows in raids. Chances are that brothers would not deliberately kill each other, but the fact that one has a brother in an enemy village by no means constitutes sufficient reason to desist in raiding that village.

*621 Club fights within villages frequently pit close
602 agnates against each other, but when club fights escalate to
578 killing by spear thrust, it is not likely that such agnates
*628 will fight against each other. Distantly related agnates,
613 however, occasionally do fight against each other with the
726 intent to kill. Much of Yąnomamö warfare involved hostilities between villages that contain as the dominant political bloc local descent groups of the same lineage.

602 Perhaps the most important structural difference between agnatic and affinal ties is that the former tend to grow weaker as the kinsmen get older, whereas the latter are

602 capable of becoming stronger in time. When two descent groups
602 exchange women with each other over several generations, the
613 cognatically related members of the two groups have strong
582 ties with each other. Further exchanges between these groups
583 is largely a validation of the previously existing implicit
60 obligations to exchange women. MoBrSo is, whether or not you
582 marry his sister, a shoriwä. When the marriage rule is followed, and it is a number of times each generation, the ties between shoriwä are correspondingly strengthened by the exchange.
602 Agnatic ties do not have the potential of increasing in solidarity; the tendency seems, in fact, to be just the opposite.

602 The major components in the variation of the strength
561 of agnatic solidarity are genealogical closeness, relative
621 age, and co-residence. To provide a crude measure of the
128 relative importance of these variables, I have arbitrarily
591 assigned values to the components in Table 3. A strong tie is scored as "***" and a weak tie as "—". By adding the number of asterisks in each possible combination, a rough measure of relative solidarity of agnatic type is given. For example, agnates who are closely related genealogically (A_1: "***"), who differ significantly in age (B_2: "***") and who live in the same village (C_1: "**-") represent a class of agnates having the greatest relative solidarity. The sum of the asterisks for this combination is 8.

In Table 3, combinations whose scores are 3 and 4 respectively constitute the class of agnates having the least

*628 *621 602 583 past. Finally, there is no way of scoring 'promises' to exchange women, and the strength of the shoriwĕ tie between members of two distinct villages is largely a function of such promises.

*621 602 • 613 Summarizing the difference in agnatic and affinal ties, the important point is that affinal ties have the potential of changing in their coefficient of solidarity when exchanges between two descent groups continues over time. It is largely for this reason that villages reduce to clusters of affinally related dual organizations (paired patrilineal local descent groups) that have exchanged women in the past and will probably continue to do so in the future.

C. Ferocity and Bellicosity

773 823 According to the Yąnomamŏ Moon Myth, Uhudima, a Spirit, shot Moon with an arrow. The drop of blood that fell to the earth flowed over the surface, causing all Yąnomamŏ to become fierce. Ever since that time the Yąnomamŏ have behaved fiercely, because they were born in blood.

823 577 The Yąnomamŏ regard themselves as being violent, coercive, crafty and quick to display aggressiveness; they 829 value this behavior. Yąnomamŏ contacts with other tribes 648 and with civilized foreigners have been consistently hostile until about 1955. They have succeeded in exterminating one tribe,[1] and have caused a number of villages of another tribe to relocate in order to avoid the attacks mounted on them by

[1] The Makú; see Migliazza, 1965.

*621 organization is only approximated, however, as an examination of the genealogies given in Appendix A will show. The smaller the village, the more conspicuous is the tendency for the composition to approach a moiety-like structure. Larger [613] villages are more composite and may contain as many as four or five distinct lineage segments.[1]

*621 The tendency for small villages to be characterized 613 by two (and only two) dominant lineage segments, each linked to the other by marriage ties, recurs with sufficient frequency to permit me to use a simple dual organization model as the [629] basis of the analysis of village structure. The model given in Figure 1 should be taken as only a heuristic devise in the discussion of Yanomamö village structure that follows; the Yanomamö do not conceive of their villages as being bifurcated into two groups, for in most instances they are not. And, small villages soon lose their moiety-like structure as they begin to include males and females from villages with which marriage ties are made.

602 The relationships between kin discussed in the pre-607 vious chapter are all given in Figure 1. The adult males in 582 Generation 1 exchange sisters[2] and are, therefore, related to 583 each other as shoriwë (brother-in-law). This is a well-defined, stable, non-ambiguous relationship; the males in

[128] [1]See Appendix A for a discussion of village composition. Details of one small village are given in the Appendix, but the composition by lineage is summarized for three other villages.

[2]In Figure 1, $A_{1.1}$'s wife is the sister of $B_{1.2}$.

602 607 582 583 Generation 1 have essentially solidary relationships to each other, at least in terms of the model.

The males of Generation 1 are related to the females *[621] of that generation as either husband or brother. Ties between siblings of the opposite sex are affective and promote village solidarity.

• 613 602 Males of lineage A in the second generation are simultaneously sister's sons and daughter's husbands of male $B_{1.2}$, both relationships being conducive to solidarity. They are [583] bound to $B_{1.2}$ by affective ties and obligations to perform bride service. An analogous set of relationships binds the Generation 2, lineage B males to $A_{1.1}$. The males of both lineages in the second generation are related to each other as either brother or brother-in-law, both relationships being stable within the assumptions of this model (see below). The

*[621] FIG.1: Ideal Yanomamö Village Composition



413 602 ties between males of opposite generations within each lineage, father and son, are stable and affective; in short, the males of the village are linked to each other by relationships that are non-ambiguous and essentially amicable. Similarly, the relationships between males and females between and within generations are, excepting the husband-wife tie, well-defined by the incest taboo and/or affective ties that contribute to the solidarity of the group.

128 Certain assumptions are made about the Yąnomamö by reducing their social organization to a model of this sort. First, I have drawn the model with a sex-ratio of 1.0. Second, sibships are shown to be equal in size and identical in composition, i.e., each contains an equal number of males and females. Third, all individuals are married to a single person. Fourth, no deaths and remarriages have taken place. Fifth, the model does not specify whether or not any of the women are pregnant or nursing. Sixth, no military pressures from the outside are shown, nor are political commitments to cede women to allies. Seventh, all males are presumed to have similar political ability and do not compete for village leadership. The list of assumptions could be extended, but would not add to the point made by the seven already given: factors external to the model constantly impinge upon the relationships described in the model, causing the relationships to alter according to the stresses brought about by the external forces.

By adding a few more individuals to Generation 1 and

Thus, while Figure 1 serves as a rough model of the ideal Yanomamö village, it does so to only a very limited degree; we are obliged to make faulty assumptions concerning the factors that influence the relationships between individuals included in the model.

Figure 2 gives the simplified genealogical structure of Lower Bisaasi-tedi, the smallest village for which I have adequate genealogical data.[1] This village is divided into two factions, shown as A and B in Figure 2.[2] Faction A is comprised of a local segment of the Sha lineage, a man and his adult children (4 sons and 1 living daughter), and the individuals or families that are attached to this group. Faction B, similarly, is a composite group consisting of the descendents of a man who married into the Sha lineage in the distant past. For sake of convenience, I will call the core political group of Faction B a local segment of the Tom patrilineage, for it behaves as such.[3] It should be noted

[Text Continued on Page 123]

[1] Not all individuals of this village are shown in Figure 2. Appendix A gives the complete genealogies of all individuals in Lower Bisaasi-tedi. The numbers shown on Figure 2 correspond to the numbers given in the list of residents and genealogy in Appendix A.

[2] Figure 2 takes into consideration classificatory aspects of the kinship system. That is, some of the relationships indicated in the figure are biologically incorrect. The reader will have to refer to the genealogy in Appendix A for purely biological relationships among the individuals in Lower Bisaasi-tedi.

[3] The Tom (from Tomorowä) is not represented in any other Namowei-tedi village, although females of this lineage have married men who are presently living in other Namowei-tedi villages such as Patanowä-tedi, where their living descendents are presently found. (See Appendix A genea-

[Footnote 3 Continued on Page 123]

128 that Lower Bisaasi-tedi approximates a dual organization of
*621 two intermarrying lineages, Sha and Tom.
● 613

There are two senses in which Lower Bisaasi-tedi is
162 not representative of the typical Yąnomamö village: the sex
*621 ratio is nearly 1.0, i.e., there are about as many females as
*628 there are males in the village, and the group is politically
562 stable and cohesive; not a single fight took place within
583 this group during the 15 months of my field work. The sex ratio is explainable by several factors. First, the members of this village have been particularly successful in forcing their Shamatari allies to cede women to them while at the same time have managed to avoid reciprocating the exchanges. Secondly, a large Shamatari family from Mąmaribąwei-tedi recently took refuge in the village, a family that comprises
[529] two males and four females. Finally, many of the men killed
[574] in the 1950-51 treacherous feast were from this faction of
[726] Bisaasi-tedi.

*621 The solidarity of Lower Bisaasi-tedi stems from a
622 number of factors. First, all adult men are married. More
613 importantly, the core lineages (Sha and Tom) are linked to
602 each other in three generations by marriage ties, and the leader of this village, Reromawä, has astutely manipulated

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128 logy.) The Tom lineage is the dominant political group in a
*621 number of villages north of the Orinoco River in the vicinity
*628 of Maata-u (see Map B, Chapter II). These villages trace
613 their origins back to a single group (indicated as Husirawä-urihi-tedi on Map C, Chapter V) to which the members of Namowei-tedi were allied about 1900. All living members of the Tom lineage found today among the Namowei-tedi are in Bisaasi-tedi's lower village, where they constitute a major political bloc in the affairs of that group.

the kinship system to his advantage, putting all adult men in the village in a subordinate position to himself. Let us briefly examine the composition of this village.

Figure 2 shows the ties between the two lineages over three generations: the individuals in both lineages are tied to each other by consanguineal as well as affinal ties. In a negative sense, the village is characterized by an absense of remotely-related agnates that might constitute a challenge to Reromawë for leadership. All agnates within each faction are closely related to each other, and their mutual rights and obligations in the political affairs of the village are well defined. The hangers-on, on the other hand, are related to males of the two core lineages by stable, but subordinate, affinal ties such as son-in-law or brother-in-law. Reromawë is a particularly capable leader on the basis of his personal qualifications alone.[1] His position as leader is bolstered by the nature of the ties that link him, individual by individual, to every adult male in the village. He has four adult sons to support his position. Equally significant, he has manipulated the kinship system and 'changed' the generation of a number of his kinswomen so as to advance his position as leader. He redefined two classificatory daughters as 'sisters,' making it possible to arrange marriages between his own children and the children of these women. He was able to do this because many of the

[1] His son, Bäkëbowë, is gradually assuming some of the functions of leadership, as Reromawë is getting old.

actual brothers of these women were killed in the 1950-51 treacherous feast,[1] and the women therefore had few agnates to contest Reromawë's actions; his rights to dispose of these women increased after their brothers were killed in the feast. Because of the previous marriages between the members of the Shá and Tom lineages, Reromawë was already MoBr to the politically most important males in the Tom lineage, and he could command respect from them by virtue of the fact that he was of the ascending generation and principal wife-giver to them. He in fact gave two daughters to one of these men. When he re-defined one of his classificatory daughters as sister, he advanced his position in two ways. First, he then became shoriwë to the man that was married to this sister (the man was already SiSo to Reromawë), compounding the cognatic tie (SiSo) that linked them with an important affinal tie (shoriwë). Second, he was able then to claim a daughter of this 'sister' as a wife for his own son (despite the fact that it was incestuous), creating additional stable ties between the two lineages on another generational level.

In another, similar, case, Reromawë re-defined a different classificatory daughter as 'sister,' making it possible for her son to marry his daughter. This was a strategic move, for the man involved was of the Hor lineage, a dominant political group in Upper Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi. Thus, by manipulating the kinship system, Reromawë advanced his own position as village leader and managed to

[1] See Chapter V.

*621
622
613
602 subordinate his potential competitors by the way in which he disposed of the women and/or their children.

*621
613
602
562
582
583 There are a number of individuals in Lower Bisaasi-tedi who are not related agnatically to either the Sha or the Tom lineages. These individuals do not, however, constitute a political bloc; each is tied by marriage to the two lineages, and are therefore subordinate (by virtue of obligations to their wife-givers) to the members of that lineage. Most of these individuals are females, and do not represent a political factor in the affairs of the village. Some of them were abducted from Shamatari villages in the past, and a larger number of them were obtained in marriage alliances from other Shamatari recently. The six adult males of this non-agnatic group who might pose a threat to the stability of the village by making liaisons with married women are all married themselves. With the exception of two brothers, they are unrelated to each other. One of them is married to Reromawä's daughter, another is married to his son's daughter, and the two brothers (actual WiBrSo to Reromawä) are married, respectively, to Reromawä's classificatory son's daughter in Upper Bisaasi-tedi and will move there while he does his bride service, and a classificatory brother's daughter.[1] The remaining two men are in Faction B. One of these joined Reromawä's group before 1945 to get revenge against the

[1] This woman is one of the seven abducted by the Monou-tedi from the Patanowä-tedi and taken, in turn, by Reromawä's group from the Monou-tedi. Technically, then, Reromawä is her 'father' and the man to whom she was given is 'son-in-law' to Reromawä. See Chapter V.

*621 members of his own village, Hasaböwä-tedi, who killed his
• 613 father. Reromawä's group was then actively raiding Hasaböwä-
602 tedi. The man was given a wife in Reromawä's village, the
562 widow of a Tom man killed in the 1950-51 treacherous feast.
582 The man's two daughters are married to Sha men.[1] The last
583 man and his family joined Reromawä's group in 1965 to take refuge from his own villagers, the Mǫmariböwei-tedi, some of whom wanted to take his wives away from him for being brutal. He had previously given a daughter to a Tom man and when he was forced to flee from his own village, took refuge with his son-in-law. Appendix A gives more details on each individual discussed above.

*628 Lower Bisaasi-tedi has political ties with a number
582 of villages. It has recently (since 1960) entered into al-
583 liance with two Shamatari villages, Reyaboböwei-tedi and Mǫmariböwei-tedi, and has managed to obtain a number of women from the latter village as wives for young bachelors
*628 in the group. The Mǫmariböwei-tedi visit them frequently to
627 feast and trade, and the members of Lower Bisaasi-tedi
574 reciprocate the visits. The ties between Lower Bisaasi-tedi
438 and the Mǫmariböwei-tedi are nearly as strong as the ties
602 between Lower Bisaasi-tedi and any of its cognate villages to whose members the Lower Bisaasi-tedi are agnatically re-
*628 lated. Of the villages that are cognate to Lower Bisaasi-tedi,
602 Monou-tedi is perhaps the most dependable ally, because the

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[1] Reromawä's actual son, and Reromawä's classificatory son in Upper Bisaasi-tedi.

*628 Lower Bisaasi-tedi gave its members refuge during the times
[602] when the Monou-tedi were threatened by raids from the Patanowä-
tedi. The closest neighbor, geographically, to Lower Bisaasi-
[361] tedi is Upper Bisaasi-tedi (a mere 400 meters upstream), the
[613] dominant political group of that village being a segment of
the Sha lineage. The two villages, however, behave quite in-
dependently in their alliance patterns. Lower Bisaasi-tedi's
political interests are in the Mǫmaribǫwei-tedi at the present
time, whereas Upper Bisaasi-tedi's interests are in the
*628 Reyabobǫwei-tedi, Karohi-tedi, and Widokaiya-tedi. In the
726 war against the Patanowä-tedi, both the Lower and Upper
Bisaasi-tedi aid the Monou-tedi by providing warriors for the
raiding parties, and by giving refuge to the Monou-tedi when
raiding is particularly intense.

*621 Lower Bisaasi-tedi is a cohesive, well-integrated,
162 stable village. Much of the stability and cohesiveness de-
562 rives from the fact that there is not a shortage of women and
571 there are well-defined patterns of behavior for all members
*628 vis-à-vis others. But, Lower Bisaasi-tedi is not a militarily
722 viable group. It could not last long as an independent vil-
lage if the warfare situation became intense; the group is not
completely independent of the Upper Bisaasi-tedi village. At
least once during my field work the Lower Bisaasi-tedi group
coalesced with the Upper group when a raid from the Patanowä-
tedi seemed imminent. And, if raiding from the Patanowä-tedi
began, the group would have to merge with Upper Bisaasi-tedi
for defense purposes. When I began my field work in 1964,

FIG 3 LINEAGE STRUCTURE



621 628 578 602 622 reduced to the weakness of the tie between remotely related agnates of the same age, and their rivalry for both women and leadership. The leaders of the three villages are all members of the same lineage.[1] It can be seen in Figure 3 that the headmen of the villages (indicated as 1, 2, and 3) are all agnates, each belonging to a different local segment of the lineage.[2]

621 622 602 613 578 As was shown in the last chapter, the ties between distantly related agnates of the same age are probably the most ambiguous and weakest ties in Yanomamö kinship. The feuds that developed within the large, composite village could not be satisfactorily resolved by the leaders of the village, as each leader's segment had more important and stronger ties with local segments of other lineages, and local segments of the same lineage aligned themselves with their affines in disputes against the factions of their agnates. 621 628 602 613 When the village split, it separated along the weakest lines: agnates that were distantly related dispersed to different villages with the groups to which they were more closely bound, their affines. The same is true of the separation of Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi from the Patanowä-tedi. Factions A and B of Lower Bisaasi-tedi, when put into the larger,

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[1] In 1965 the Sha headman of Monou-tedi was killed by the Patanowä-tedi in a raid.

[2] The Sha lineage is shown on the left half of the diagram; it extends to Patanowä-tedi, as does the Hor lineage shown on the right side. Patanowä-tedi's composition is simply an enlarged version of any of the other villages shown in the diagram, and its headmen come from the Sha and Hor lineages.

composite group shown in Figure 3, would behave as a single faction as opposed to all other groups in the composite village, for the ties that unite them to each other by marriage are more stable and better defined than the ties that unite the Sha portion of Lower Bisaasi-tedi to the Sha portions of Upper Bisaasi-tedi or Monou-tedi. In structural terms, large villages are congeries of dual organizations each with separate political interests that have largely to do with maximizing their own access to women. Individuals in any particular dual organization are more closely related, consanguineally, to members in other dual organizations, but their political fate is tied up in their relationships to affines, not agnates. They are supported in internal feuds by their close agnates only, and their brothers-in-law; distant agnates are potential rivals for the women in the village, and relationships between such men is restrained and potentially hostile. Leaders of local segments of one lineage cannot expect political support from agnates of the same age; for these reasons, local segments of the same lineage tend to separate from each other when the village splits.

The histories of the villages show that hostility between recently established cognate villages is a common feature of the settlement dynamics and social organization of the Yanomamö. Appendix A gives the composition of all Namowei-tedi villages by patrilineage affiliation; it is apparent that the war between the Patanowä-tedi and the Monou-tedi is largely a war between agnatically related kinsmen.

*621 *628 • 613 602 It is more than coincidental that the composition of both Monou-tedi and Patanowë-tedi is more similar in terms of Sha and Hor lineages than the similarity between any other two Namowei-tedi villages. Patanowë-tedi is merely an enlarged version of Monou-tedi in composition, there being more agnatic ties between these two groups in the Hor and Sha lineages than between any other pair of Namowei-tedi villages. Yet the hostilities between them are very intense.

*621 162 B. Village Size and Warfare

Yąnomamö villages range in size from 40 to 250 individuals. Both limits are determined by the nature of Yąnomamö warfare, but the upper limit is set in large measure by the capacity of kinship and leadership to organize the internal affairs of the village. This capacity diminishes as village size increases.

*621 162 722 The largest Yąnomamö village for which I have complete census data is Patanowë-tedi, a group comprising 212 individuals. The Patanowë-tedi assert that their southern neighbors and allies, the Ashadowë-tedi, are even more numerous, and that a number of Shamatari villages are, in turn, larger than Ashadowë-tedi. It is doubtful, however, that the numbers involved excede 250 per village. Villages of this size, as we have mentioned for Patanowë-tedi, tend to fragment into smaller groups when threat of war subsides, and these smaller groups re-combine to form a larger village when warfare again threatens one or all of the colonies. The reason villages

18:Chagnon E-4.5 (1964-1966) 1967 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

time illustrates the weakness of the agnatic bonds.

When villages split, large lineages are redistributed by local descent group affiliation among the several newly established villages. These new groups tend to be quite small, but never fall below a population size of about 40 people for reasons having to do with the successful conduct of raiding. These small villages tend to approximate a dual organization of intermarrying local descent groups. Newly formed villages enter into military alliances with other villages and exchange women with them. Over time, such exchanges alter the homogeneity of the respective villages and promote the development of new lineage segments within each village. As the village grows in size and as new segments emerge over time, internal village stability reduces and the village then splits again. Village splitting is frequently delayed or inhibited by the existence of an active group of enemies, and even after such a split the newly-established villages may reunite when threat of raid is imminent. When military pressures decrease, the village again fragments into smaller groups. The minimum size of these groups is set by the number of adult men required to effectively conduct raiding. It appears that these small villages would fragment into even smaller groups if warfare were to cease.

000 the factions still remain on friendly terms.

*62 *62 59 59 72 105 Material presented in the discussion above--details of the movements of factions that are not relevant to the origin of the five villages considered here--also support the contention that villages split over internal feuds. That villages are structurally unstable is evidenced by the sheer number of village splits and the fact that the related factions enter into hostilities with each other after separating. Data I collected on village movements for other Yanomamö groups support the conclusions I reach here.

*62 *62 60 58 58 105 [613] One can see that the process of village splitting leads to the formation of independent villages that comprise closely-related kinsmen. Intuitively, one can also see that marriages "between" such villages, i.e., between spouses that each claim to be of different villages, do not necessarily represent political alliances between those villages, for in many cases the marriages were contracted between the local lineages involved before they separated. This is not to say that all the cases of this sort can be dismissed in this fashion. Some marriages between ambilateral cross-cousins are in fact properly interpreted as marriage alliances between villages, for occasionally related villages enter into alliances with each other. In these cases, the marriages between them come about for essentially the same reasons that the exogamic marriages between unrelated groups occur. In short, the existence of the marriage rule alone does not account for alliances between related groups that enter into politico-military pacts.

fighting and warfare are reduced when the available women carry on affairs. Thus, I conclude that any factor which increases the sexual activity of females or increases the female/male ratio reduces the frequency of fighting.

The second conclusion I reach is that Yąnomamö marriage practices can be predicted, in a broad sense, once the conditions of warfare are specified. The greater the intensity of warfare, the more marriage practice will deviate from the preferred types. This follows from the fact that the Yąnomamö are forced to base military alliances on exchanges of women, limiting the degree to which ideal marriage preferences are expressed in practice.

We may now turn to a more theoretical discussion. Writing on the functional significance of marriage ties, Leach (1957) drew attention to the importance of economic factors in the integration of affinally-linked corporate descent groups, concluding that such integration as did occur was due largely to the delayed payment of bride price. The existence of this debt had the effect of consolidating the weak affinal ties, for the debtor group was economically bound to the bride-giving group. Although it has been shown above that the solidary ties between any affinally-linked Yąnomamö descent groups are due largely to military, marital and economic obligations, the problem of the lack of solidarity between agnatically related descent groups has not been satisfactorily explained. The instability of relationships between agnatic Yąnomamö corporate descent groups can be reduced to

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two major structural problems: the lack of corporate functions of the local descent groups due to the nature of the corporation's estate, and the ambiguous nature of agnatic kinship ties. Within a framework such as this, affinal ties are capable of promoting solidarity between corporate groups because marriages among the Yanomamö are political alliances that involve military obligations. Local descent groups enter into marriage alliances to advance their military status; the context, therefore, within which marriages are contracted decidely influences the relationships between the corporate groups in question.

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The debate between Fortes and Leach arose out of the interpretation of the importance of matrilateral kinship ties in patrilineal societies, as these ties are the focal points in any analysis of the means by which solidarity is achieved between corporate descent groups. Briefly, Fortes maintained that the solidarity between lineal descent groups was ultimately due to the inherent tendency of kinship to promote amity. Leach, on the other hand, argues that such an analysis confuses affinal relationships with descent and fails to take notice of the effects of the economic and political contexts within which marriages take place.

Leach drew attention to the fact that ethnological perspectives developed from analyses of patrilineal societies such as the Nuer, Tiv, and Tallensi have biased later workers to focus their attention on lineal corporations and on the common descent ties between corporations when they analyze

114 12 602 Among the Yąnomamö consanguineal kinship does not have the quality attributed to kinship in general by Fortes, and we therefore cannot explain the stability that exists in terms of these alleged properties. The fact that affinal ties do promote a certain amount of stability between Yąnomamö descent groups supports Leach's arguments, and, for the reasons implied by Leach: Yąnomamö marriages occur within a political context that promotes military obligations and concomitants not predictable from first principles regarding the putative nature of kinship itself. Descent groups exchange [413] [513] [582] [722] [581] women with an eye toward maximizing military advantage in a milieu of hostile political relationships. The stability brought about by such marriages is, therefore, largely a function of the politico-military ends served by marriage and is only tangentially, if at all, a result of kinship.

12 I would also like to discuss the nature of the relationship between corporation and descent from another point of view, for the nature of the estate of the Yąnomamö descent corporation gives a particular quality to the corporation. Most corporate lineal descent groups have as one of their major functions the control over and disposition of property. The property is usually real property. Pastoralists, of course, have as their estates, herds and use rights to forage areas. Some Northwest Coast and northern California tribes have corporate groups whose estates are acorn groves and portions of salmon streams.

In addition to real property, corporate groups

121 having such estates, particularly in those societies to
613 which real estate is totally irrelevant. The Yąnomamö
562 corporate estate consists entirely of rights in disposing
421 of female members belonging to that corporation. As such, males and females have different kinds of shares in the corporation. Males, on the average, tend to inherit more rights, while females tend to inherit more duties and obli-
[423] [341] gations. Land to the Yąnomamö is not a scarce item, as they are pioneer slash-and-burn horticulturists expanding into
[424] virgin territory.[1] Myths, names and ritual functions do not comprise elements in these corporations.[2]

121 It would seem important to distinguish between lineal descent corporations which control property and those which do not, as Befu and Plotnicov (1962) have done. A further distinction, however, seems warranted on the basis of the data presented here: between <u>societies</u> having any corporate groups that control real property and societies that have corporate descent groups, none of which have control over property as their estate. The possession of real estate tends to reinforce the lineality of corporate descent groups in both dogma and composition,[3] and invites the addition of

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[184] [1]This is true of the Mavaca Basin Yąnomamö. Elsewhere the Yąnomamö may not be pioneers, but land is not scare in those areas either.

[2]I am aware that the Yąnomamö have lineally transmitted totems; these have nothing to do with the descent group recruitment or its estate.

[3]See Meggitt, 1965, for an excellent account of the relationship of agnatic kinship, real property, and lineage

121 new functions for the corporation, thus leading to greater integration among its members. These qualities are weak or absent in descent corporations which lack real property.

[43] [123] The Yanomamö descent group corporation, therefore, presents a number of theoretical problems not encountered in the study of societies having corporations whose estate consists, above all, of real property.[1]

One of the problems is the definition of the group by a criteria other than descent alone; both descent and residence are critical in recruiting members to the corporation. The factor of residence as a criterion of recruiting members into corporate groups has been dealt with by Firth (1957). He showed how residence was critical in establishing affiliation to 'ambilateral' (ramage) descent groups among the Tikopians, and how individuals, in some cases, have a choice ('option') in affiliating with one of a number of lines of descent in, for example, the Maori hapu. Although Firth argued that property alone was not the basis of the individual choices,

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dynamics and Sahlins (1963) for a discussion of the important difference between group dogma and group composition.

[1] I do not think that the problems raised can be satisfactorily solved by classifying corporations by function. The Yanomamö have a solidarity problem largely, I feel, because the descent groups compete rather than cooperate. It would seem that the overall integration of this or any society would be enhanced by the existence of additional corporate group functions besides the disposition of marriageable females. In order to appreciate the contribution land controlling corporations have in total social integration, we must distinguish landed societies from others.

121 he acknowledged that the corporation did in fact function in the context of property control as well, suggesting once again that the nature of the estate (land) accounts for the quality of the corporation: that is, that the functions of the corporation are seen to lie largely in the regulation of real estate.

Leach (1963)[1] drew attention to the analytical significance of the local descent group in terms of its function in arranging marriages. He argued that the social groups that arrange marriages in tribal societies are essentially the same in all such societies: they comprise local males of three generations who live together. Membership in these social groups necessarily depends on residence. Yąnomamö descent groups are of this type: to participate in the disposition 121 • 613 602 [611] *[621] [584] of local females, one must be related to the patrilineally, as well as live in the same village with them. Both the importance of the marriage arranging functions of the Yąnomamö descent group and the lack of other corporate functions seems to account for the fact that affinal ties promote inter-group solidarity in a way that consanguineal ties can not.

121 On the basis of these findings, Leach's approach to the analysis of social organization would seem to hold more promise in the analysis of marriage alliance systems. To the extent that cultural variables such as warfare and the nature of marriage ties demonstrably affect the outcome of

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[1] The article to which I refer, "The Structural Implications of Matrilateral Cross-Cousin Marriage," was originally published in 1951.

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APPENDIX A

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VILLAGE COMPOSITION AND GENEALOGY OF LOWER BISAASI-TEDI

1. Lower Bisaasi-tedi

Lineage	Male	Female	Totals
Sha	9	7	16
Tom	9	3	12
Nor	1	2	3
Kio	2	4	6
Shamatari	3	9	12
Other	1	1	2
Total	25	26	51

2. Upper Bisaasi-tedi

Sha	11	13	24
Nor	8	5	13
Kio	5	11	16
Kah	5	3	8
Shamatari	3	7	10
Rob	0	1	1
Other	5	8	13
Total	37	48	85

3. Moncu-tedi

Sha	11	9	20
Nor	15	8	23
Kio	3	3	6
Shamatari	3	9	12
Other	2	3	5
Total	34	32	66

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4. Patanowë-tedi

Lineage	Male	Female	Total
Hor	58	33	91
Sha	25	14	39
Rob	14	15	29
Kah	17	8	25
Kar	1	3	4
Shamatari	2	6	8
Ashadowë-tedi	0	5	5
Other	5	6	11
Total	122	90	212

*621 162 551 613 Lower Bisaasi-tedi inhabitants. (Numbers preceding names correspond to those next to individuals given in genealogies.)

Name of Individual	Patrilineage	Sex	Age	Comments
1. Ahimi	Hor	F	20	
2. Ahimi's son	Sha	M	0.2	
3. Auhewä	Tom	M	25	
4. Auhewä's son	Tom	M	1	
5. Auma	Kio	M	21	
6. Bäkäböwä	Sha	M	29	Becoming headman
7. Bäkäböwä's da.	Sha	F	1	
8. Boarama	Shamatari	F	6	Alliance
9. Bokosiwä	Sha	M	23	
10. Caraca-tedi	Sha	M	3	
11. Didihoma	-	F	5	See p. 213
12. Dimörama	Shamatari	F	20	See p. 213
13. Dodoiwä	Tom	M	52	
14. Heihunioma	Sha	F	19	
15. Hekäwaiyowä	Sha	M	2	
16. Hesiwä	Tom	M	65	
17. Hikarima	Shamatari	F	36	Abducted
18. Hoahemi	Kio	F	52	
19. Huimashima	Sha	F	6	
20. Irokaweikä	Sha	M	20	
21. Kakoma	Sha	F	19	Abducted, see p. 213
22. Kakoma's da.	Kio	F	0.1	
23. Katabema	Shamatari	F	3	See p. 213
24. Kɵobauwä	Kio	M	26	
25. Krämi	Kio	F	20	
26. Mamorakomi	Shamatari	F	34	See p. 214
27. Mamoshiklabema	Tom	M	4	
28. Manasinawä	-	M	56	See p. 214
29. Nioremi	Sha	F	28	
30. Monokoiwä	Tom	M	13	
31. Monomi	Shamatari	F	19	Alliance

	Name of Individual	Patrilineage	Sex	Age	Comments
32.	Monomi's Da.	Tom	F	0.2	
33.	Nakakami	Sha	F	56	
34.	Niaiyowë	Sha	M	14	
35.	Ömonoiwë	Tom	M	28	
36.	Reromawë	Sha	M	53	Headman
37.	Rosa	Sha	F	8	
38.	Ruwisa	Tom	F	7	
39.	Shiborowë	Shamatari	M	35	See p. 214
40.	Tiaböwë	Shamatari	M	5	See p. 214
41.	Tomahewë	Tom	M	21	
42.	Tomasi	Tom	M	6	
43.	Ugushi	Hor	M	22	
44.	Waiimi	Hor	F	21	
45.	Waiyamobemi	Shamatari	F	19	Alliance
46.	Waiyamobemi's son	Sha	M	0.5	
47.	Waiyuruma	Shamatari	F	50	Abducted
48.	Wakarabewë	Shamatari	M	16	Son-in-law to #6
49.	Yëbënëma	Kio	F	33	
50.	Yareama	Shamatari	F	2	See p. 214
51.	Yotoma	Tom	F	24	

Comments on particular individuals

1. Ahimi. Her present husband (Bokosiwë) visited the Patanowë-tedi within the past 5 years. Ahimi then lived in Patanowë-tedi and was married to a Sha man there (Makoakuwë), by whom she had already had one daughter (Huimashima). When Bokosiwë returned to Bisaasi-tedi, Ahimi followed him, taking her daughter with her, and became Bokosiwë's wife. As the Patanowë-tedi were technically at war with the Bisaasi-tedi, there was not much they could do to recover the woman. As they also wanted to make peace with Bisaasi-tedi, they did not press the matter.

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

Fig. 3–1. Ideal Yąnomamö marriage pattern.

Fig. 3–1 can be presumed to represent the organization of a particular village over five generations, starting in the year 1888. Let us assume that the village originated in that year when individuals x_1 (and his sister, not numbered) and y_1 (and his sister) broke away from a larger village and established their own garden at some new location. Thus, in the year 1888, the village was comprised of two groups of kinsmen, X and Y. These two kinship groups are called lineages, the distinctive features of which I will discuss later.

In generation I, x_1 married the sister of y_1 and, in exchange, gave his own sister to y_1 as wife. This marriage practice is called *brother-sister* exchange and characterizes Yąnomamö marriage behavior. A man is under considerable obligation to *reciprocate* a woman to the kinship group from which he has taken one. In Fig. 3–1, x_1 married y_1's sister and reciprocated the exchange by giving his own sister to y_1. Because of this obligation of reciprocity, kinship groups become interdependent socially and form pairs of woman-exchanging kin groups. These paired kinship groups are discussed below in the context of village fissioning.

In generation II of Fig. 3–1, the village still contains only two groups of intermarrying kinsmen. These are the children of the individuals who founded the village. The reciprocal exchanges of women between the two groups of kinsmen (lineages X and Y) continue in the second generation, x_2 getting his wife from lineage Y and vice versa. Like their fathers, x_2 and y_2 exchanged sisters. It will be noted at this point that x_2 has married his mother's brother's daughter, who is simultaneously his father's sister's daughter.[1] This is a logical consequence of the fact that there are only *two* lineages in

[1]This is called bilateral cross-cousin marriage. See glossary for definitions. Hereafter the following abbreviations will be used, following Murdock, 1949: Mo—mother; Fa—father; Br—brother; Si—sister; So—son; and Da—daughter. Thus, "mother's brother's daughter" is simply MoBrDa.

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the village, the members of which being related to each other as brother and sister, and the fact that individuals must marry outside their own lineages.

The important features of the lineages X and Y are now clearly visible in generation II: The lineages are patrilineal and exogamous. That is, males and females belong to the lineage of their father (patrilineality), and individuals must marry people who belong to a different lineage (exogamy). This can be seen more clearly in the symbols used in Fig. 3-1. All males of lineage X are designated by triangles (x_1, x_2, x_3 . . . x_8), and all females of lineage X are designated by hexagons. Similarly, all males of lineage Y are designated as squares and all females by circles. Males of lineage X marry females of lineage Y. Their children belong to lineage X because their *father* (patrilineality) is of lineage X.

The Yąnomamö kinship system also reflects the rules of lineage exogamy, brother-sister exchange and reciprocity. Their kinship system is called the "bifurcate merging" type with "Iroquois" cousin terms (see Glossary). Within each generation, all the males of one lineage call each other "brother," and all the women call each other "sister." Males of lineage X call males of lineage Y "brother-in-law" and are eligible to marry their sisters. In fact, the males of lineage X call the females of lineage Y "wife" *whether or not they marry them.* This is likewise true for the males of lineage Y with respect to the females of lineage X. This brings us to another important Yąnomamö marriage rule: A male must marry a woman of the category called *suaböya*—"wife." This is called a *prescriptive* marriage rule.[2] To state it more precisely, Yąnomamö society is characterized by a rule that enjoins a man to marry a woman of a specific kinship category; he has no choice with respect to the category.

There is an important controversy over the meaning and implications of the term "prescriptive." I have given the definition held by British anthropologists generally, by Needham (1962*a*:9) in particular. This definition emphasizes the fact that men have no choice with respect to the category of women from which their wives must come, that men are forbidden to marry women of other categories, and that the society itself is said to be characterized by the prescriptive rule. The opposition to this definition comes largely from certain American anthropologists, who maintain that a society can only be said to have a prescriptive marriage rule when a high percentage (close to 100 percent) of the people marry according to the rule (see Coult and Hammel 1963:291). The issues involved are not quite as simple as this, but a glimmering of the area of contention can be seen in an example provided by Leach (1965). Rephrasing his example, the rule (in our society) "thou shalt not kill" is like the rule (among, say, the Yąnomamö) "thou shalt marry a woman of category A." These rules can be said to exist in the respective societies irrespective of the homocide rate in New York or the frequency of aberrant marriages in a Yąnomamö village. That is, Leach (and Needham) maintain that one cannot discover such a rule by counting examples of murder (or, rather, "non-murder") or marriages of men to women of category A. The more basic issue, however, is the

[2]Professor Lévi-Strauss, who read an earlier draft of this chapter, quite correctly pointed out that to say a marriage system is "prescriptive" is to say no more than "a man must marry a marriageable female," which is a tautology. Nevertheless, we must have some way to distinguish a system that permits marriage with only a single category of women from those that permit marriage with women of several categories. By showing what is meant by the Yąnomamö category *suaböya*, as I have attempted to do in Fig. 3-2, the reader will gain some idea of what is meant by that marriage type. I have used the term "prescriptive" because it is the current usage.

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meaning of, in this case, "category A." It is customary to represent primitive kinship categories in models (for example, Fig. 3–1) by their closest biological equivalents in *our own kinship system*. Many critics of Needham's definition of prescription fail to appreciate the fact that *FaSiDa* and *MoBrDa* in a model like the one given in Fig. 3–1 represent just *two* of several kinds of kinswomen who fall into the prescribed category. That is, they interpret the native's kinship category from the narrow point of view of one of that category's biological meanings in *our own kinship system*. (I have given ten examples of actual Yąnomamö marriages in Fig. 3–2, discussed later, to illustrate what the categories FaSiDa and MoBrDa mean to the Yąnomamö.) The use of Needham's definition of prescription to characterize Yąnomamö marriage rules can be justified, therefore, on several grounds. First, the Yąnomamö assert that a man must marry a woman of the *tuaböya* category. Second, of the six primary categories used by men to classify female relatives, five of them embrace women who stand in incestuous relationship to the male speaker, and he is forbidden to marry any woman that falls into any of these five additional categories. Third, we will see below how closely the alternative definition of prescription fits the Yąnomamö, using their own notions of kinship to reckon relationships between males and females.[3]

In Fig. 3–1, marriageable women are related to their husbands as both FaSiDa and MoBrDa; this is an artifact of the way in which the model is drawn. These two kinds of kinswomen are the closest biological equivalents in our kinship system for the Yąnomamö term "*tuaböya*:" "wife." It must be emphasized, however, that given the classificatory nature of the Yąnomamö kinship system (for example, men of the same generation and of the same lineage are "brothers"), there are several ways to be related to a woman as "wife."

Something new has happened in generation III. A man (w_1) from a distant village, along with his sister, has joined the group. Both he and his sister have married into lineage X. Thus, there are three lineages represented in the village (W, X, and Y), and the *dual organization* characterizing generations I and II is now lost.[4] A Yąnomamö village can incorporate new lineages into its social life by an extension of marriage ties to its members. As can be seen from Fig. 3–1, the same rules—exogamy, reciprocity, patrilineal descent, and brother-sister exchange—that characterize the behavior of the members of lineages X and Y also hold for the members of the new lineage, W. The incorporation of lineage W takes place this way. W_1 joined the village in 1928 (generation III) because x_3 and x_4 promised him one of their sisters. As shown in Fig. 3–1, he did, in fact, marry one of their sisters and gave, in exchange, one of his sisters to x_3.

This (potentially) brings about an important structural change in the village with

[3]For an excellent summary of the various arguments concerning "prescriptive alliance," see Maybury-Lewis 1965*a*.

[4]A society is said to have dual organization when, for example, it is comprised of two intermarrying kinship groups, such as lineages X and Y in generations I and II of Fig. 3–1. In some societies the intermarrying kin groups are named, for example, "Bear Clan (or Moiety)" and "Thunderbird Clan (or Moiety)." The Yąnomamö do not have named kinship groups such as this. Dual organization is, however, implied in their kinship terminology and marriage rules and, as will be seen, villages tend to have two (and only two) politically dominant lineages that intermarry. In short, the Yąnomamö village tends to be comprised *in fact* of two dominant kinship groups but lacks some of the ideology, such as named pairs of intermarrying kin groups, of classical dual organization. See: Maybury-Lewis, 1960 and 1967; Lévi-Strauss, 1963, Chapter VIII; Ni[illegible]dajó and Lowie, 1927; and Malinowski, 1926, for further descriptions and analyses of societies having dual org[illegible]ion.

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respect to the male members of lineage X. Generation III shows that individuals x_3 and x_4 are full brothers. The individuals x_5 and x_8 of generation IV, however, are not shown as brothers, although in Yąnomamö kinship usage they would be such.

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I have not indicated them as being related as brothers in order to draw attention to a fault line that may develop when the members of a single lineage (X in this case) marry into more than one other lineage (W and Y in this case). x_3 and one of his sisters married into lineage W, whereas x_4 and one of his sisters continued to exchange with members of lineage Y. In the following generation the kinship tie of "brother" between x_5 and x_8 is considerably weaker than the same "brother" tie between their fathers (x_3 and x_4). In generation V, the "brother" tie between x_7 and x_8 is weaker still. One of the reasons that *agnatic* ties[5] weaken in this case is that the men in question are drawn into intimate relationship with the kinship groups from which they obtain their wives and assume, because of the principle of reciprocity, obligations to their affinally related (that is, by marriage) kinsmen.

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Secondly, because agnates of the same generation are "brothers," they can marry the same women and are, hence, competitors. In other words, the obligations to exchange women (reciprocity) can link the members of affinally related groups to each other more intimately than ties of blood between males of the same lineage. (This can be more readily seen in Figs. 3–5 and 3–6, discussed later, but it can also be partially illustrated here.) If the village shown in Fig. 3–1 were to split in generation V and form two new villages, lineage X would pull apart along the fault line shown. That is, parts of lineage X would end up in each of the two new groups because the affinal (marriage) ties between its members and their wife-givers are stronger than the agnatic ties within the lineage. Individual x_7 and his sister would form a new village with w_3 (and his sister) while x_8, his "brother" (agnate), would remain paired with lineage Y. Lineage X would therefore be represented in both of the two new villages; individuals x_7 and x_8 would "feel" even more remotely related because they now live in different villages, although they would continue to call each other "brother." Finally, the two new villages would again demonstrate the dual organization that characterized generations I and II of the original village of Fig. 3–1. For the sake of simplicity I have shown each married pair with only two children (except in generation III) so that the village remains constant in size, growing only by the addition of new members. In an actual village lineages X and Y might comprise up to 80 percent of the population so that the addition of a few new members such as w_1 would not appreciably alter the dual composition.

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In Fig. 3–1, lineage X stands as wife-giver and wife-receiver with respect to the other two lineages. The significance of this relationship cannot be exaggerated in the analysis of Yąnomamö social organization. Its strength derives from the obligations kinship groups have toward each other once they enter into reciprocal marriage exchanges. The wife-giver/wife-receiver relationship is also reflected in the attitudes men have toward their affines, such as brothers-in-law, as opposed to attitudes toward distant agnates. A man is on very intimate terms with his brother-in-law, jokes with him, gives him possessions, and protects him; a man treats an agnate of the same age with great reserve and coolness and tends to be jealous of him. He cannot, for example, directly ask

[5]Kinship ties between patrilineally related kinsmen.

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him to do a favor, whereas he could ask this of a brother-in-law.[6] As shall presently be seen, the dynamics of Yąnomamö social organization originate in the politics of obtaining a wife. Within this context, agnates are competitors and affines are allies. This has an important effect on the manner in which villages fission and form new groups. The point to remember at this juncture is that ties of marriage are in many cases stronger than ties of blood.

I emphasize this because many anthropologists argue from "first principles" that ties of blood are—by definition—more capable of promoting solidarity and amity than ties by marriage. The controversy over "complementary filiation" between E. R. Leach (1957) and M. Fortes (1959), still not satisfactorily resolved, was essentially a debate about the analytical significance of marriage ties. Focusing on only one of the issues and rephrasing the arguments so as to apply to Fig. 3–2, the debate ran something like this: Both Leach and Fortes seemed to agree that in societies having lineal descent groups (lineages), the descent groups would tend to fall apart unless some kind of tie bound the members to each other. That is, lineages X and Y of Fig. 3–2 would, in short, pull away from each other unless they were held together by some special social tie. Fortes argued that this special tie was the solidarity and amity that grew out of the cognatic (see Glossary) kinship ties between the two lineages which arise when individuals marry blood relatives. Looking at generation V, for example, Fortes would argue that lineages X and Y are bound to each other because x_8 and y_8 married women to whom they are related by blood (as FaSiDa and MoBrDa). He argues from first principles that solidarity emanates from the blood ties. Leach, however, states that in generation V the two lineages are bound to each other by obligations to reciprocate goods, services, and women and that the solidarity of the two lineages derives from the affinal ties themselves (shown as "15" and "16" in Fig. 3–2). If we look only at generation V, the argument cannot be resolved, since the data support both arguments equally well, or at least do not convincingly support one rather than the other. I might add that both arguments can be supported by data not given in Fig. 3–2; Fortes' arguments are supported, for example, by the additional fact that Yąnomamö men do not stringently have to avoid their mothers-in-law when they are related to them in the fashion shown in Fig. 3–2, whereas the avoidance taboo is very onerous when a man's mother-in-law is not a blood relative. If, however, attention is focused on the events of generation III and their consequences examined, it can readily be seen that the affinal (marriage) ties in generation V are stronger than some of the agnatic (blood) ties, and the latter break when the village fissions. (This can be even more readily seen in Fig. 3–4 and 3–5, discussed later.) Thus, it cannot be argued that Yąnomamö lineage solidarity derives exclusively from blood ties and "complementary filiation." There is another issue. Structural analyses depend in large measure on a sharp distinction between marriage (affinal) ties and blood (consanguineal) ties. Fortes seems to deny that affinal ties as such exist independently of blood ties, and he has "subsumed" them into his concept of "complementary filiation." If there is no such thing as affinal ties between lineal descent groups, then structural

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 61]

[6] In addition, it is by no means rare for agnates to get into club fights over women. I even have recorded a number of cases of men shooting and killing a "brother" during raids. This happened on two occasions during my first stay in the field, and I have reports of several additional cases obtained from informants who were describing past raids.

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analysis of reciprocal marriage exchanges between such groups and the obligations implied in such exchange is seriously hampered. In short, if Yąnomamö marriage exchanges over a number of generations and the kinship basis of village fissioning are examined, the data support Leach's arguments. They do not, however, invalidate Fortes' argument that blood ties create some solidarity, but they do call into question the contention that blood ties by definition, or, rather, on "first principles," account exclusively for the solidarity occurring between lineages.

In summary, Fig. 3–1 represents a number of important features of Yąnomamö social organization. First, people reckon descent through males and are grouped into exogamous, patrilineal lineages. These are called *mashi* by the Yąnomamö, although none of them bear distinctive names.[7] Second, members of these lineages tend to intermarry with the members of a second lineage over a number of generations, being bound to them by obligations to reciprocate women in marriage. This results in a dual organization of kinsmen within the village, whose residents fall into one or the other of the two lineages. Third, new lineages can be incorporated into the village by an extension of marriage ties, potentially bringing about "structural faults" within the lineages of that village. Fourth, men are obliged to marry a woman of a single, specific category, *tuaböya*. This category defines a variety of women, two subcategories of which can be translated into the English biological equivalents MoBrDa and FaSiDa. Yąnomamö men prefer to marry women of these subcategories because they are relieved of much of the discomfort of avoiding their mothers-in-law.[8]

The ten partial genealogies shown in Fig. 3–2 show how the Yąnomamö actually marry. The genealogies have been selected with the intention of illustrating how the Yąnomamö reckon relationships between kinsmen in general, and between husband and wife in particular. All ten exemplify prescriptive marriage. They are more or less arranged in decreasing order of correspondence to our own biological concepts of kinship and illustrate the classificatory nature of their kinship system.

The people shown on these genealogies are (or were) real people. Many of the individuals in the examples are related to each other in such ways that all ten of the examples could be drawn as a single, unified genealogy.

The first eight examples are drawn from the village of Patanowä-teri; the last two are from Bisaasi-teri. In case J, for example, the fifth individual of the second generation is Kąobawä. To give a rough idea of the incompleteness of each genealogy, only one of Kąobawä's four marriages is shown and only one of his four children. None of his brothers and sisters are shown either, nor is the fact that he married a MoBrDa indicated.

Case A illustrates the identification procedure to be used in relating the genealogies to the text. There are three generations shown in case A; the first is symbolized by the Roman numeral I, the second, by II, the third, by III. Each individual in each generation is given a number; the number series runs from left to right and begins anew with 1 in each generation. Hence, every individual bears a generation number and a position-within-generation number. Case A illustrates the marriage of individuals III–1 to III–2;

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 63]

[7] *Mashi* means "species," "group," "cluster of similar things," and, in the context of kinship, "that group of people to whom I am related through males;" that is, "patrilineal kinsmen."

[8] I draw attention to the fact that the category is *prescribed*, but within it there are *preferences*. There are very few analyses of societies that have a prescriptive rule within which there are preferences, although Needham has devoted some attention to this interesting phenomenon (1962*a*, 1962*b*, and 1963).

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FaSiDa is the same as MoBrDa, and both are called by the same term, *suaböya*. Hence, to present the above examples as the Yąnomamö would explain them I would not have had to distinguish MoBrDa from FaSiDa, but rather would have had to use just one term; in every case presented, men married their *suaböya*. (This can be seen in the model shown in Fig. 3–1; each male married a woman who was simultaneously FaSiDa and MoBrDa, that is, *suaböya*, to him.)

Cases I and J: These are a little unusual, but I include them to give some idea of both the potentials of the Yąnomamö kinship system and the people who use it.

In case I, individual II–2 is the headman of Lower Bisaasi-teri, Kąobawä's "father." He has considerable authority in the group. He arbitrarily redefined some of his classificatory daughters as sisters *so that his sons could marry their daughters*. Thus, the marriage of IV–1 to IV–2 is now considered to be legitimate because IV–1 could call his wife's mother his mother-in-law (FaSi), since his father redefined her as sister. Otherwise, it would be incest. Most of the people adjusted their kinship usage to fit the circumstances, but Kąobawä, who gave me the details of the manipulation, refused to adjust his own terms. The redefined women in question are his sisters, and he refused to call them FaSi.

I came upon this, and several identical cases, when I learned that the kinship usage between specific individuals did not reflect the equations implied by genealogies. (After I had collected extensive genealogies on four villages, I spent a considerable amount of time collecting kinship terms from specific individuals for every one of the some two thousand individuals included in the genealogies. This served as a cross-check on the genealogies, but uncovered a large number of incestuous and other interesting marriages that I might not have pinpointed otherwise.)

Case J brings out the full potential of the classificatory nature of Yąnomamö kinship. The man (III–1) married his *suaböya* according to the Yąnomamö, although he was not related to her by any blood ties. The justification for the marriage is the fact that III–1 calls all the women to whom his father and his father's brothers are married by the term for mother. Hence, he married his MoBrDa.

THE LINEAGE It was shown in Chapter 1 that villages fission to produce new groups. One of the consequences of this pattern is that in a given area there will be a number of villages whose members can trace genealogical ties to each other because they have common male ancestors. Because of the classificatory nature of Yąnomamö kinship, the interrelated members of two different villages will use kinship terms for each other that imply a closeness of relationship. Thus, Kąobawä has "brothers" in all of the villages that have a common history with his own. These men are usually parallel cousins one or two degrees removed, but brothers in terminological categories. (The lineage to which Kąobawä belongs is shown on Fig. 3–3, discussed later as the *Sha* lineage.)

The Yąnomamö do not name their lineages. I have named all the significant lineages after particular male individuals, usually a long-since-dead male whose generation is the last for which I have meaningful genealogies. Thus, the *Sha* lineage is named after a man called *Shamabiadima*, long dead. He and his brothers left many male descendants who today are distributed in several villages. In the history of the movements of Kąobawä's village, the *Sha* lineage has figured prominently in the affairs of the group. Similarly, the *Hor* lineage is named after a man called *Horiberiböwä*. The *Sha* and *Hor* lineages have a long history of marriage alliance and the living members of these two lineages constitute the greater fraction of the populations of Patanowä-teri, Monou-teri,

Upper Bisaasi-teri, and Lower Bisaasi-teri (see Table 1). Politically, they are either the two dominant lineages in each of the above-named villages or one of the two dominant lineages. For example, the headmen of Upper and Lower Bisaasi-teri, Kąobawä and Reromauwä, respectively, come from the *Shs* lineage. In Patanowä-teri there are two headmen, one from the *Shs* lineage and one from the *Hor* lineage. Finally, in Monou-teri, the headmanship shifted from the *Shs* lineage to the *Hor* lineage in 1965 because the *Shs* headman was killed in a raid by men from Patanowä-teri. I might add that he was killed by men of his own lineage to whom he was related as "brother." After he died, his brother-in-law, of the *Hor* lineage, assumed the leadership. It is not surprising that the headmanship shifted to this large, important group. In terms of sheer numbers, the *Hor* lineage (see Table 3–1) was stronger than the *Shs* lineage in Monou-teri. The distribution of political power within these two lineages underscores the dual organization of most Yąnomamö villages.

It is apparent from the foregoing example that the ties between agnates who live in different villages are not necessarily amicable. The most bitter fighting, in fact, takes place between members of different villages who are related to each other agnatically. It is not uncommon for men to kill their classificatory brothers in the ensuing raids. As a consequence of the killing of the Monou-teri headman, for example, the raiders from Monou-teri avenged his death by shooting Bosibrei of Patanowä-teri. The two men who actually killed Bosibrei were related to their victim as brothers. Similarly, Kąobawä himself shot Rakoiwä, the present *Shs* headman of Patanowä-teri, wounding him badly. He had shot to kill even though Rakoiwä was his older (classificatory) brother.

Once the lineage splits up and is redistributed in several villages, the ties between the men of that lineage weaken dramatically. And, as we shall see below, the fissioning of a village is frequently the result of a bitter club fight within the village over the possession of women. The result is that many villages that have a common history are at war with each other due to the nature of the feuds that led to their splitting away from the common village. The Patanowa-teri, for example, are at war with all three of the villages from which they originally separated (see Fig. 3–5, discussed later).

The kinship ties between agnates who live in the same village are likewise quite weak. They are strongest between a man and his younger brothers, for the age differences alone call forth a certain amount of respect and amity. An older man can be expected to aid his younger brothers in fights and help them to secure wives. In some cases, the younger man obtains his wife from a polygynous older brother; some men appear to accumulate extra wives with the intention of passing them on to their younger brothers. Kąobawä, for example, gave one of his wives to a younger brother and will probably give another wife to a second younger brother. (He is presently permitting the brother to share her sexual services.) Kąobawä's older wife, Bahimi, is quite jealous of the co-wives because they can command some of the tasty morsels of food that would otherwise be her own prerogative. And, since the younger wives are more attractive physically, Kąobawä does pay considerable attention to them. In Lower Bisaasi-teri, one of Kąobawä's classificatory brothers was forced by his older wife to get rid of his young, attractive second wife. The man gave her to an unmarried younger brother. He himself had acquired the younger wife as part of a political alliance he had made with the members of an allied village, knowing at the time that his first wife would object strenuously to the

TABLE 3-1

VILLAGE COMPOSITION BY LINEAGE MEMBERSHIP*

Lineage	Male	Female	Total
A. Lower Bisaasi-teri			
Sha	9	7	16
Tom	9	3	12
Hor	1	2	3
Kio	2	4	6
Shamatari	3	9	12
Other	1	1	2
	25	26	51
B. Upper Bisaasi-teri (Kaobawä's group)			
Sha	11	14	25
Hor	8	5	13
Kio	5	11	16
Kah	5	3	8
Shamatari	3	7	10
Other	5	8	13
	37	48	85
C. Monou-teri			
Sha	11	9	20
Hor	15	8	23
Kio	3	3	6
Shamatari	3	9	12
Other	2	3	5
	34	32	66
D. Patanowä-teri			
Hor	58	33	91
Sha	39	29	68
Kah	17	8	25
Kar	1	3	4
Shamatari	2	6	8
Other	5	11	16
	122	90	212

*Revised version of Appendix A, Chagnon 1966.

transaction. Still, he took the girl. When domestic tranquility could no longer be maintained, he passed her on to his younger brother.

The relationship between a man and his brothers of approximately the same age are generally not amicable. Brothers of the same approximate age tend to be jealous of each other and treat one another with considerable reserve and respect. A man can directly ask an immature younger brother to execute some task for him, but he can

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only suggest to a brother of the same age that the task should be done. This is equally true should one of them be the village headman. Kąobawä can ask his youngest brothers to perform many menial tasks during the preparations for a feast, but he cannot ask his mature brothers to help out. Thus, when it is time to clean the weeds from the village plaza to prepare the dance site, Kąobawä himself initiates the work, a form of suggestion that the task must be done. After a while his older, politically important brothers will join him, but only on their own initiative. He could not directly ask them to do this work. On one occasion a young man stole my flashlight and gave it to Shiimima, a younger brother to Kąobawä, but already a mature adult. I asked Kąobawä to help me get it back. After a day or so I asked him if he had gotten my flashlight back from Shiimima, whereupon he replied: "I have spoken to him about it. He will return it if he sees fit. I cannot order him to do so because he is already fierce." Adult brothers of the same age are under considerable pressure to establish their prowess and masculinity and do not permit other men, including their mature brothers, to boss them around. By contrast, Kąobawä could have *commanded* his youngest brother to return the flashlight, since the latter was not yet "fierce," that is, politically significant in village affairs, hence, anxious to display personal autonomy.

Finally, people can trace remote genealogical relationships to others under many circumstances. Kąobawä continuously spoke of the headman of a distant village as his brother. When I questioned him about his usage, he explained that he and the other man have a common patrilineal great-grandfather, that is, he *demonstrated* (see Glossary) his genealogical relationship to the man in question. The other headman gave a similar account.

In small villages the male members of the same lineage are usually on fairly intimate terms with each other. As the village grows in size, however, closeness of genealogical relationship becomes an important measure of the amity between brothers. That is, some men who are related as brothers group together and behave as a political unit. They group together because they are closely related genealogically and have common interests with respect to obtaining wives. If the village is very large, there may be two or more such groups of brothers within the same lineage. The larger lineage begins to segment into smaller factions, resulting in groups of agnates who are on more intimate terms with the members of their own group than they are with their genealogically more distant agnates who, in turn, constitute a different group.

THE LOCAL DESCENT GROUP This lineage segmentation was implicit in Generation V of Fig. 3–1 and arose because of the way in which members of lineage X entered into marriage alliances with members of the incorporated lineage W. These groups of brothers—segments—are called local descent groups.[9] Local descent groups have three characteristics. First, membership in them depends on patrilineal descent. Hence, the members all trace relationships to each other through males, and one can only be a member of the group if such a relationship exists. Second, the members of the group live in the same village. If, for example, a young man leaves his village to seek a wife elsewhere, he is no longer a member of the local descent group that includes his brothers and

[9]Leach, 1951. Yąnomamö local descent groups differ slightly from the definition given by Leach; among the Yąnomamö such groups rarely include more than two generations of males, whereas Leach defined them as embracing three generations. Otherwise, Yąnomamö local descent groups closely fit Leach's definition.

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father. He can rejoin them later and again become an active member, but while he lives in a different village he does not participate in the political affairs of that group. Third, the group is *corporate* with respect to the functions of arranging the marriages of the female members. This is the most important single feature of the local descent group: its *function*. The first two characteristics of the group dealt only with the manner in which members can be recruited to the group (birth in the group and coresidence of such kinsmen). In anthropological usage, a corporation is a group of people who share some *estate* and have *rights* and *obligations* with respect to each other and to the estate. There are definite rules for recruiting new members into the corporation. Most studies of primitive corporations have dealt with those societies in which *land* is the estate of the corporation. (See, for example, Fried 1957.) Among the Yąnomamö, land has nothing to do with the functions of the corporate group. Women and rights to dispose of women in marriage constitute the estate of the Yąnomamö corporate groups. Leach is the first anthropologist to draw attention to the analytical importance of this kind of corporation (1961, Chapter 5), although Radcliffe-Brown (1953), in one of the first theoretical discussions of primitive corporations, emphasized the importance of rights over *persons* in some kinds of corporations.

Marriages are arranged by the male members of the local descent group. It cannot be supposed, for example, that the marriage rules automatically dictate the manner in which a woman is disposed in marriage; there are always some negotiations brought about by the situation. For example, a small village may require alliances with larger villages for purposes of defense, and the men of the small village may promise to give daughters to men in the larger village; or there may be a number of men within the village that stand in wife-receiving relationship to the girl, and a decision must be made regarding her ultimate disposition. In some cases a woman's daughters are promised to young men even before they are born. Generally, the girls are near puberty age by the time they are definitely given to a specific male, and they begin cohabiting with the man shortly after the puberty ceremony is over. In some situations a woman must be reassigned to an appropriate mate because her first husband died or abandoned her; or she might run away from a cruel husband and seek refuge among her brothers, bringing about a situation in which they must decide what to do with her.

Women abhor the possibility of being given to men in distant villages, since their fate is much less certain. Men in general are cruel to their wives, and the women rely on the protection of their brothers. A woman who is given to a man in a distant village, therefore, will generally have no brothers to protect her.

A man has considerably more say about the disposition of his daughters when he is young and has immature sons. As the sons grow older, they can overrule the father and insist that the girl be given to a man from some lineage that is likely to reciprocate with a sister. Ideally, women like to be given to men within their natal village. In this fashion the women can remain close to their own kinsmen and rely on the support of their brothers should the husband be particularly cruel. The best arrangement for everyone concerned is for the girl to be given to a man to whom she is related as FaSiDa or MoBrDa in the biological sense. Marriages of this kind exempt the husband from the onerous duty of stringently avoiding his parents-in-law, whereas they at the same time bind the wife-giving and wife-receiving groups more closely together in the system of reciprocities. As Kąobawä stated it, "It is good for groups to exchange women back and

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forth in this fashion. They will be good friends because of it."[10] If the girl marries a man of this category, the probability is high that she will remain in the village with her parents and brothers, since exchanges of this kind keep affinally linked local descent groups bound to each other.

The consequences of the corporate marriage-arranging functions of the local descent group can be most easily seen in the lineage basis for village fissioning, shown in Fig. 3–4. Briefly, the politics of arringing marriages are such that local descent groups of lineage X will pair with similar groups of lineage Y, and largely confine their marriage exchanges to those groups. Putting it more simply, each local descent group of lineage X will pair off with one local descent group of lineage Y, and stand in wife-giver/wife-receiver relationship to that group. When the village fisions, the paired local descent groups will be more strongly bound to each other by marriage ties than each is to the other local descent groups of its own lineage.

VILLAGE FISSIONING Fig. 3–4 presents the structural basis of village fissioning in terms of paired local descent groups. Village A contains two lineages, X and Y. Each lineage has four local descent groups. For simplicity of presentation, only the male

[10] I obtained a nearly identical explanation of reciprocal marriage exchanges of this kind from one of the Makiritare Indians, northern neighbors to the Yąnomamö. The Carib-speaking Makiritare have a prescriptive bilateral cross-cousin marriage rule like the Yąnomamö. My informant told me, in Spanish: "It is necessary for a man to marry his *yetomade* [their equivalent to the Yąnomamö category of *mudehju*]. In this fashion families become good friends because they marry with each other time after time. When you marry this way, you are good friends with your *sudeya* [brother-in-law] and can play and joke with him. You are also good friends with your *sudima* [father-in-law]. If you marry a different way, you must be careful around your *sudima* and respect him."

Fig. 3–4. Distribution of paired local descent groups in village fissioning.



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members are shown. Each group is paired off with an equivalent local descent group of the opposite lineage, giving the four numbered pairs. When village A fissions to form villages B and C, lineages X and Y will break at the weakest points, resulting in the formation of two new villages that have an identical composition: Village B is like village C in size and contains two local descent groups of lineages X and Y; the two local descent groups of each lineage in both new villages are paired with the analogous group of the opposite lineage. Fig. 3-4 can be viewed as a diagram of the physical organization of the village. Thus, in village A the male members of lineage X would tend to live on one side of the village, while the males of lineage Y would live on the opposite side. In actual distribution, then, the village has a "diametric dual organization" (Lévi-Strauss, 1961, Chapter 8). The Yąnomamö, however, do not conceive of the village as having discrete halves. That is, they do not have formal rules enjoining the male members of lineage X to live on one side of the village. There are always residential exceptions to the arrangement shown in Fig. 3-4.

Village B fissions again, resulting in the further breakdown of lineages X and Y. The outcome, villages D and E, is essentially like the outcome of the fission in village A; that is, the resulting new villages are alike in composition, size, and structure. Village C has not fissioned and continues to exist as it did after separating from village B. A comparison of the three villages shown in the last step of Fig. 3-4 will reveal that D, E, and C' are interrelated villages because patrilineages X and Y occur in each of them. The members of the patrilineages would still continue to call each other brother and sister, although they would be distributed in three different villages. The genealogical ties connecting villages D, E, and C' have been drawn in to emphasize this relationship.

The reason that lineages break down in this fashion stems from the fact that remote agnatic ties are weaker than the marriage ties that link the paired local descent groups to each other. The strength of the affinal ties between paired local descent groups derives from the obligations of reciprocity in marriage exchanges. Thus, when village B fissioned, local descent group X-1 had stronger ties to Y-1 than it did to X-2. The result was that X-1 and Y-1 separated from X-2 and Y-2 to form their own village, D.[11]

Fig. 3-4 describes the "ideal" pattern of village fissioning. Fig. 3-5 shows the structure and composition of three actual Yąnomamö villages for comparison. As in Fig. 3-4, only the adult males are shown. The incomplete triangles of Upper Bisaasi-teri in Fig. 3-5 signify that the men in question do not live in that village, but they must be included in the diagram to show that their sons live in Upper Bisaasi-teri. The two men actually live in Patanowä-teri, the composition of which is not shown in Fig. 3-5. What has been shown is that the lineages *Hor* and *Shi* extend into Patanowä-teri. In fact, the population of that village is comprised largely of members of these two lineages. See Table 3-1. Only the adult male members of the villages are shown for the three villages in Fig. 3-5, since it is this class of men that dominates the political affairs of the village. For those interested in *all* the genealogical relationships between *all* the members of one of the villages (Lower Bisaasi-teri), see Chagnon, 1966, Figure 2 and Appendix A. As can be seen from Fig. 3-5, each village is characterized by a dual organization of intermarrying lineages. In 1960, Lower Bisaasi-teri and Upper Bisaasi-teri were, in fact, a single village. It can be seen how local descent groups of the *Shi* lineage, for example,

[11]The pair "X-1 and Y-1" is represented on Fig. 3-4 simply by the numeral "1".

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621
613
582
608



Fig. 3-5. Actual village fissioning.

separated from each other because of the ties each had to affinally linked descent groups of other lineages. Thus, Lower Bisaasi-teri is comprised essentially of two groups: a local descent group of the *Sha* lineage and a local descent group of the *Tam* lineage. Their members have exchanged women with each other for several generations, creating strong bonds of reciprocal obligations to continue to exchange in the future (Chagnon 1966). Similarly, the local descent groups of the *Sha* lineage in the two remaining villages shown in the figure are linked by affinal ties to other lineages.

Further back in history—1954—Monou-teri also constituted a portion of the village that included Upper and Lower Bisaasi-teri (see Fig. 2-4, Chapter 2). Finally, the three villages shown on Fig. 3-5 constituted a single village with Patanowä-teri about 1940. The fissioning of the original village (and subsequent village fissioning) resulted in the distribution of local descent groups according to pairs, as shown in Fig. 3-4.[12]

Discrepancies in the Marriage Pattern

128
582
621*

I presented in considerable detail the relationship between actual behavior and ideal rules about behavior from a qualitative point of view. This was accomplished by comparing genealogical diagrams describing some actual examples to ideal models of marriage and village fissioning. I will now give some of the quantitative aspects of marriage behavior and the demographic and political bases of the actual marriage pattern.

Table 3-2 shows the distribution of marriage types found in two related villages.

[191]

[12]In some areas of Brazil the pattern of village fissioning is slightly different. There, a local descent group may even establish its own house, separated from the wife-giving/wife-receiving member of the pair by as much distance as several miles. What I have been calling the "village" in this discussion breaks down, in portions of Brazil, into several "part-villages" that are not capable of carrying on an independent social existence. That is, members of the "part-village," the composition of which is essentially a single local descent group of one lineage, must obtain their wives from some other nonlocal group.

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sexually active females. Some of the teen-age males have homosexual affairs with each other; the females of their own age are usually married. By the time a young man is twenty years old or so he is anxious to display his masculinity, and at that point becomes a competitor for the sexual favors of the village belles—married belles. This causes considerable friction and results in club fighting. (See Chapter 5.)

Still another factor leads to breeches of the marriage rule: chance. In some villages there are disproportionately more males (or females) of the same lineage because of the way in which the group split from a different village. Again, there may be no eligible females when a young man is old enough to marry. His only choice is to seek a wife in a different village. Rerebawä, for example, was forced into this situation. His own village is quite small (about 50 people), but it is dominated numerically by members of his own lineage. Hence, most of the females in the village are related to him as mother, sister, or daughter. The remaining females are married to his older brothers. He therefore came to Upper Bisaasi-teri—an ally of his village—to seek a wife.

Thus, political necessity, cultural practices relating to population control, unequal distribution of women, and chance combine to produce situations in which people cannot follow their prescriptive marriage rules. The factors dealing with politics are the most meaningful in explanations of the discrepancy between Yanomamö marriage behavior and ideal models of that behavior.

POLITICAL BASIS The importance of politics can be demonstrated by citing a few incidents in the history of several villages and explaining how alliances and hostilities develop over time.

In Chapter 1 I briefly described the political milieu within which Kaobawä's village was situated. The relationships that exist at the present time make considerably more sense when they are viewed in the perspective of the historical events that led up to them. The reasons for village fissions and wars and why particular villages have entered into alliances with each other will now be explored briefly.[14]

The more important political ties currently maintained by Kaobawä's group have antecedents that go back to approximately 1940. At that time the present villages of Patanowä-teri, Monou-teri, and Upper and Lower Bisaasi-teri were one large village (see Fig. 2-8). In 1940, they were known collectively as the Patanowä-teri. To their south was a series of villages whose residents are collectively known as the Shamatari people. The Patanowä-teri were on friendly terms with most of the Shamatari and frequently visited them in order to trade. Just prior to 1940, an epidemic, probably malaria, resulted in the deaths of a number of Patanowä-teri. The Shamatari were suspected of causing the epidemic by practicing harmful magic. The first Shamatari man to visit the village after the epidemic, Ruwahiwä, was treacherous killed by a man who presently lives in Monou-teri; he bashed his head open with an axe. This immediately precipitated a war between the Patanowä-teri and several of the Shamatari villages.

A few years after the war started the Patanowä-teri fissioned into two groups: They relocated their gardens, but remained fairly close to each other geographically. This split was caused by constant bickering within the group and club fights over women. The two new villages thus formed were friendly enough to each other to live in the same

[14] I discussed these relationships in considerable detail in my doctoral dissertation, Chagnon, 1966. The following account is a simplified version.

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New individuals are incorporated into the community by an extension of kinship ties. Unless one is incorporated into the village in this fashion, there is no basis for social behavior vis-à-vis others, for the kinship system defines one's role in society. An orphaned teen-ager joined Kąobawä's group shortly before I began my fieldwork. He was from a distant Shamatari village and had no blood relatives in Kąobawä's group. He established his position in the community by calling Kąobawä "father." This defined his relationship to all of Kąobawä's kinsmen as well. As an exercise in kinship, I had the young man give me his relationship term for everyone in the village. He not only had specific terms for every member of the group, but he had also extended them to all the residents of Lower Bisaasi-teri and Monou-teri as well, since Kąobawä was related to these people. In short, the boy learned how Kąobawä was related to all the members of three different villages and logically extended his own assumed relationship to Kąobawä outward to the others; and he behaved toward them accordingly: He avoided women he called mother-in-law and refrained from sexual activities with women he called sister.

To emphasize the fact that the kinship categories do not always correspond to biological relationships, let me give an example of an incestuous marriage. Kąobawä's younger brother, Shiimima, recently (1966) took a young girl for his wife, outraging most of the community because he "behaved toward her as brother" before the marriage. The girl's mother had been abducted some twenty years earlier from a distant village and was given to a man who stood in a father relationship to Kąobawä and Shiimima. Thus, both Kąobawä and Shiimima called the abducted woman "mother" and called her daughter "sister." The abducted woman's husband died of malaria; after this, she had a number of temporary affairs with other men before being officially taken as a wife by another man in the village. Her daughter is the issue of a temporary affair she had with the headman of Mahekodo-teri, the group that gave Kąobawä refuge after the treacherous feast in 1950. She is, therefore, biologically unrelated to Kąobawä and Shiimima, but since they behaved toward her as brothers, Shiimima's marriage to her is a blatant case of incest. The matter was as disgusting to my informants as it would have been had Shiimima married his own biological sister.

There are many important kinship distinctions in Yąnomamö social life, but the one between relatives by marriage and agnatic relatives should particularly be emphasized. This distinction is at the basis of Yąnomamö political behavior and village fissioning. This point was emphasized in the discussion of village fissioning and marriage rules in the first section of this chapter.

One of the most important characteristics of affinal ties is that they are capable of growing in strength over time because they can be solidified and reinforced by marriage exchanges between the groups. Ties between agnates, on the other hand, tend to weaken over time. For example, Kąobawä's local descent group could renew its friendship to similar affinally related groups in the village of Patanowä-teri by entering into marriage exchanges with them once again. There is no way, however, in which his own descent group could reinforce or strengthen the agnatic ties with the local descent groups of the *Sha* lineage in Patanowä-teri. By marrying into the affinally related Patanowä-teri descent groups, Kąobawä's group would enter into direct competition with agnatic counterparts in that village, further straining the relationships between the two communities.

There is another way of looking at this situation. Men who are related to each other as agnates (for example, brothers and parallel cousins) get along well with each

602 other when they are children and young men. As time passes and these men become old
571 enough to seek wives, members of the groups to which they belong enter into competi-
602 tion with each other. The men themselves are under some pressure to display their per-
571 sonal autonomy, and they treat each other with considerable reserve as they get older.
578 They cannot boss each other around or expect many favors from one another. Kaobawä, for example, cannot ask his adult brothers to perform menial tasks for him. This is because each man—particularly those men who compete for the same women—attempts to convince all others that he is capable of ferocity. The more remote the genealogical distance, the greater is the reserve with which mature agnates treat each other. That is, distant parallel cousins would behave toward each other with considerably more reserve than would actual brothers, although the men in question are all related to each other terminologically as brothers. If such men live in different villages, their mutual relationships are even more reserved when they meet.

602 The relationship between men who call each other brother-in-law, however, grows
607 more intimate as the men get older. They can play and joke with each other, whereas
571 agnates cannot, for they are not competitors and are not constrained to exhibit their
581 fierceness to each other. They can cement their relationships to each other by merely
582 promising to give their daughters to each other's sons. They can ask favors of each other, expecting them to be done without complaint.

602 Kaobawä's relationships to two men in his village illustrate the distinction be-
[601] tween agnates and affines. Both men joined his group from the village of Patanowä-teri some time after Kaobawä's group separated from the village. One of the men, Nadesiwä, is related to him agnatically: they call each other "brother" because their fathers were half-brothers. Nadesiwä is in Kaobawä's local descent group, but is not quite on a par
[613] with the other members in the political affairs of the group. The other men in the
[581] group—Kaobawä and his closer brothers—put pressure on Nadesiwä to give his only
[582] daughter to a man in a distant Shamatari village for the purpose of stabilizing an alliance. This was a considerable sacrifice for him to make, as his daughter, after the
[591] completion of bride service, will have to live in her husband's village—Nadesiwä will
[606] have no coresident son-in-law to provide him with meat when he gets old. Kaobawä and Nadesiwä treat each other with respect and great reserve and do not ask each other for favors.

602 The other man, Kumamawä, is Bahimi's actual brother; Kaobawä is related to
607 him, therefore, as an affine as well as by cognatic kinship ties. That is, they are first
[591] cross-cousins by blood and also related to each other by marriage. Kumamawä is a
[613] frequent visitor in Kaobawä's house and enthusiastically executes the numerous tasks that Kaobawä asks of him. They are members of different local descent groups, but their groups are related to each other by marriage exchanges that go back several generations. In short, Kaobawä's personal ties to his brother-in-law are warmer and friendlier than his relationship to one of the members of his own local descent group.

Daily Activities

361 Kaobawä's village is oval-shaped. His house is located among those of his
342 agnatic kinsmen; they occupy a continuous arc along one side of the village. Each of the

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One of Damowä's brothers—who also participated in this raid—was married to one of the victim's daughters.

The Monou-teri had anticipated their raid by clearing a new garden site across the Mavaca River, where they hoped to take refuge after the inevitable revenge raids from Patanowä-teri began. They had hoped to complete their garden before the raids became intense, as the Mavaca River would have provided a natural obstacle to raiders. The Patanowä-teri, however, were infuriated by this killing and raided the Monou-teri immediately. Two of the raiders were Damowä's "brothers."

The raiders caught Damowä outside the new garden searching for honey. This was in the first week of February. He had two of his wives with him and one child. He was looking up a tree when the raiders shot a volley of arrows into his body, at least five of which struck him in the abdomen. He managed to nock one of his own arrows and shoot at the raiders, although he was probably mortally wounded at the time. Then Bishewä, one of the raiders, shot a final arrow at Damowä, piercing his neck below his ear. He fell to the ground and died after being struck by this arrow.

The raiders did not attempt to abduct the women, as they were close to the Monou-teri campsite and they had to cross the Mavaca River to escape. The women ran back to the village to tell the others what happened. Instead of giving chase, as they ought to have done—according to Kaobawä and the others in Bisaasi-teri—the Monou-teri themselves fled into the jungle and hid until darkness, afraid that the raiders might return.

The man who fired the fatal arrow into Damowä's neck was a son of the man the Monou-teri shot in their raid. Two of the men who shot Damowä were his classificatory brothers (members of the same lineage), three were brothers-in-law (including the man who shot the fatal arrow), and one was a man who had been adopted into the Patanowä-teri village as a child, after he and his mother were abducted from a distant Shamatari village.

The Monou-teri burned the corpse of Damowä the next day. They held a mortuary ceremony that week and invited their allies, members of the two Shamatari villages and the two groups of Bisaasi-teri, to participate. Gourds of the dead man's ashes were given to specific men in several of the allied villages, an act calculated to reaffirm solidarity and friendship. Damowä's widows were given to his two eldest surviving brothers.

Kaobawä, a classificatory brother to Damowä, assumed the responsibility of organizing a revenge raid. Damowä's own brothers failed to step forward to assume this responsibility, and for a while there was no leadership whatsoever in Monou-teri. Finally, Orusiwä, the oldest and most competent member of the *Hor* lineage, emerged as the *de facto* village leader, a position he acquired largely by default. He was related to the slain headman as brother-in-law, and their respective descent groups dominated village politics.[2] Hence, leadership in Monou-teri shifted from the *Sha* lineage to the *Hor* lineage.

Kaobawä delayed the revenge raid until April, giving the Monou-teri time to expand their new garden. This date also coincided with the beginning of the rains, thus reducing the possibility of a retaliation until the next dry season and providing the Monou-teri even more time to expand their new garden and abandon the old one.

The Monou-teri were afraid to return to their producing garden, so they divided their time between their newly cleared site, where they worked at cutting timber and

[2] See Table 3-1 and Fig. 3-3 of Chapter 3 for the lineage composition of Monou-teri.